



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**Psychoanalysis
and Sociology**

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Psychoanalysis and Sociology

By
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Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul



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16/11/21

LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.
RUSKIN HOUSE, 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C. 1



First published in 1921

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PART ONE

**SOCIOLOGICAL RESULTS OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS**



CHAPTER ONE

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND SOCIOLOGY

OUR view of the relationship between psychoanalysis and sociology will be mainly determined by our view of the relationship between the individual and society. Direct sociological applications of psychoanalysis are impracticable unless the forces which dominate the mental life of the individual likewise exercise a decisive influence in the life of society, or at least unless social happenings are deducible from individual behaviour. But apart from the consideration that psychoanalysis has not yet effected a comprehensive differential study of the individual, the investigator may well be restrained from any such attempt by his recognition of the unique nature of society.

Psychoanalysis, therefore, is still far from exercising an exhaustive or even an extensive influence in the domain of sociology. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that even to-day psychoanalysis, leaving its own immediate

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field to enter the field of social science, can render here services of considerable importance.

Apart from this, there is an indirect but more promising point of contact between the two disciplines. The point is interesting were it only because psychoanalysis is in this matter sharply distinguished from the other branches of psychology, and acquires in this connexion a character peculiar to itself. I refer to those achievements of psychoanalysis which elucidate the part played by society in individual development. Psychoanalytic study has gone far to convince us that purely individual psychological categories are solely explicable through their relationships to the environing community. In this way psychoanalysis, without propounding the priority of society in any metaphysical sense, has been led to recognise the existence of an intimate mutual determinism between individual and society. Psychoanalysts, indeed, have been much occupied with the study of this mutual determinism, though not so much from the standpoint of society as from that of the individual, and above all from that of the psychopath.

At the outset, psychoanalysis was nothing more than a branch of psychiatry. Now our

science has greatly transcended these limits, not only in a psychological direction, but also in a sociological direction. The causes of these new developments are various. The most important point of all is that psychoanalysis is avowedly aphysiological, that one of the main impulses to its development has come from those who were satiated with phrase-making concerning the "nervous system" and the "nerve centres." In addition, psychoanalysis is ametaphysical, in so far as its essence lies in the descent into a stratum of facts with which no one has hitherto been systematically concerned. Consequently it has become necessary to throw a new light upon the mutual relationships of individuals.

Nevertheless, analytical treatment is predominantly social in character, since it does not consist of physical influences, but of the psychical collaboration of another human being, the physician. It is true that the same assertion might be made of all branches of psychotherapeutics. But there is an obvious and important distinction. Other methods of psychotherapeutics endeavour to work through persuasion, suggestion, hypnosis; they do not aim at unlocking and rebuilding the suffering soul, but at its mechani-

cal guidance. Now the whole spirit of psychoanalysis is not mechanical but organic. Psychoanalysis is not sorcery but work. Society manifests itself quite differently in the analyser and in the hypnotist respectively; utterly different is the aspect of individuality in the subject of psychoanalysis and in the subject of suggestion. The act of persuasion is as it were pseudorationalistic, external, and physical; the act of psychoanalysis is as it were intensely rationalistic, internal, and social.

The achievements which concern the relationships between morbid and normal minds have a definite bearing upon sociological questions, for psychoanalysis discloses the motives that operate in the normal no less than in the morbid mind. But further, from a new side, they exercise a disruptive influence upon existing systems. Thus psychoanalysis facilitates, not only the sociological study of the mind, but also the observation of inter-psychical reactions.

Finally, the free and emancipated spirit of psychoanalysis is a stream which penetrates the barriers erected—mainly for affective reasons—between the individual mind and the community. Psychoanalytical researches in the domain of the sexual life throw a clear

light upon the final enigma of the unity and separateness of the individual and society, upon the cleavage between the interindividual affective trends, upon the problems of the cleavage between the individual and the two-fold "sociality." A recognition of the intimate connexion between individual and social organisation will be facilitated by that spirit which, transcending every previous progressive thought, points to inward freedom as the correlate of outward freedom. The same spirit leads to the unprejudiced study of collective ideas, convictions, and practices. It likewise involves enfranchisement from the materialistic obscurantism of recent decades.

The question now arises, With which sociological trend is psychoanalysis most in harmony? I am not concerned with my own immediate viewpoint, but am discussing generalities. In my view, psychoanalysis, whose primary aim and method must always remain those of individual psychology, cannot aspire to a dominant role in sociology. But it can render valuable and almost indispensable services to specialised sociology. Indeed, the expert sociologist must be animated by a spirit closely akin to that of the psychoanalyst. He must be unprejudiced, but must not

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rest content with the simple accumulation of facts. He must study the nature of social organisation, the position which the individual occupies in society. Sociology must not shrink from becoming the basis of a political method, and yet in this respect the roles must not be reversed; sociology must be careful to avoid the mysticism of premature simplification. It is obvious, moreover, that psychoanalysis in its present form (being far more concerned with typical contents which have been brought to the surface than with important groupings relating to some great future) can be most readily linked with a sociology dealing, not with the distinctive peculiarities of individual civilised communities, but with the universal categories of social life.

An important question is that of aim, the aim which primarily differentiates politics from sociology. The original aim of psychoanalysis was extremely simple; the cure of the patient. The aim of politics cannot be so tersely defined. Of late, however, the idea of psychoanalysis has undergone expansion. It aims at securing for the individual a better balance, at bringing about a better adaptation to the environment, at establishing a higher rationality, and producing a more perfect harmony. But this is

precisely the aim which politics should pursue in relation to the community. As we have already suggested, these two aims cannot remain independent. There are no men without institutions, and there are no institutions without men. The observer may be especially concerned either with men or with institutions, but he must not fail to take the other element into the reckoning. Psychoanalysis, therefore, while it need have nothing to do with political party programs, must be in spiritual touch with some fundamental political trend.

Psychoanalysis is yet more intimately related to certain social aims which, though political, are not political in the narrower sense of that term. I refer to sexual reforms, the reform of family life, and the reform of education. The connexion of psychoanalysis with these things is a matter both of form and of content, for we are here concerned with influences which society exercises on the individual. Insistence upon the enormous importance of childhood is a fundamental part of Freudian psychology. The Freudians demand extensive changes in pedagogy as part of the campaign against mental disorder. Psychoanalysts point out that reform in this field is no mere matter of the provision of

hospitals and dispensaries, but that remoter causes are operative.

We can distinguish three sociological trends of psychoanalytical research. In the first of these, a socio-individual parallelism is demonstrable, so that the contents of individual ideas are discoverable in collective ideas. I refer, in a word, to the so-called folk psychology. The second trend is that in which the individual psychological foundations of social development or of civilisation constitute the object of study, so that we now find ourselves somewhat more deeply involved in the realm of sociology. These investigations are likewise concerned with primitive conditions, but their starting-point is the formation of society out of the individual and the family. The third trend is that of psychoanalysis proper, with its various radiations. Here we are concerned with the individual in his relations to extant society, and therefore with the organisation and the actual problems of society. To this domain belong analytical therapy, the analysis of healthy persons, family life, pedagogy, the problems of individualism and socialism.

From the purely sociological standpoint, the second trend might be considered the most important; though only as regards the

object of study, and not as regards its nature. Psychoanalysis tends especially to throw light on relationships in so far as it discloses the part played by society in shaping the modern individual. It makes more extensive contributions to sociology when it remains within its own sphere than when it displays a directly sociological trend. I hope in the present work to give an empirical demonstration of this assertion. It is, however, an illuminating fact that the various sub-departments just enumerated are separable by barriers which, however necessary, are purely artificial. Furthermore, it is necessary to state how far I propose to go in the interpretation of the material.

Since I regard psychoanalysis from a specific outlook, and even within this sphere look upon it as the manifestation of a specific trend, I cannot use its results in the crude state. But although I assume a certain freedom in this respect, I do so neither as critic of psychoanalysis, nor that I may supplement it or continue its work. I may merely find it necessary to interpret certain psychoanalytical results in a way which the investigator who has furnished those results might reject. I do not think that this will be a general practice, for on broad lines, alike in

respect of form and content, I stand intellectually and affectively upon the platform of psychoanalysis. I do this equally as against opponents of the doctrine and as against the members of the divergent schools. I hope, indeed, that I shall nowise do violence to psychoanalysis.

Let me remark parenthetically that I am convinced of the need, not merely for criticism along certain lines, but also for expansion and for new applications. Such an independent expansion of psychoanalytical sociology may be the topic of a later work, mainly devoted to the study of certain phases of modern social and political life.

It is further necessary to point out that the subject of the present book is not one which simply concerns the relationship between psychoanalysis and ethics. It is true that I do not exclude the discussion of moral elements, but it is necessary to keep strictly within the limits assigned to my study. Whereas political and similar movements have to do with the purposive moulding of social organisation and with the relationships of the individual to the community, ethics is concerned with individuality and with the mutual relationships of individuals. The difference relates to emphasis rather than to the existence of objects. But

the distinction cannot be eliminated, and we must be careful not to forget the fact. The present study will not be primarily concerned with ethical relationships, nor indeed will ethics receive even provisional consideration.

CHAPTER TWO

ANALYSIS OF THE MASS MIND

ONLY within limits does there exist a parallelism between the individual mind and the social mind. These limits determine how far the mechanism of individual ideas can be transferred to the social sphere. Why, for example, is an infantile sexual theory rediscoverable in a myth? Why can a statesman's political theory be reflected, in notable fashion though with hazy outlines, in the ideology of his own party? Why is it so easy to discern inspectionism in the most varied manifestations of folk psychology, whereas it would be extremely difficult to effect the psychoanalysis of an industrial theory? (I am not speaking here of the assertions of psychoanalysis, but of psychoanalysis in its fundamental nature; interpretation must set out from this.) The most obvious answer would seem to be that psychoanalysis can elucidate the more general constructions of

folk psychology. Can it, however, be contended that this applies to the two or three main political trends of our day, which are general enough at any rate? We see that the hypothesis is incomplete, if not radically false. Inadequate, too, would be the assertion that psychoanalysis does not avail where interests and the ego impulses manifest themselves. The analysis of warlike heroism would not be a difficult task, although the analysis of certain trends in contemporary sexual life might certainly prove more laborious.

We should approximate far more closely to the truth were we to contend that psychoanalysis is empowered to interpret comparatively simple collective ideas. I think chiefly of practically universal ideas, which are simple, and are not dependent upon any of the differentiations among human beings: of the more or less obvious complications and symbolisations of incest; of the fundamental partial impulses of the sexual life; of the relationship to other members of the family; of ambivalence; of the omnipotence of thought. It is especially worthy of note that the mechanism of collective ideas exhibits striking analogy with the mechanism of dreams, mental disorders, and even some of

the products of contemporary literature.¹ Psychoanalysis has demonstrated a parallelism between the more primitive groups of individual and social ideas, and has shown how this parallelism manifests itself, not merely in vague and mechanical forms of thought, but likewise in typical elaborations of universal content. Thereby is furnished an almost definitive refutation of the sociological relativism which would ascribe profoundly and significantly diverse worlds of thought to the various races or culture-groups. This achievement may prove of considerable importance in politics no less than in sociology.

The other main result is the proof that the purely collective ideas which originate from the simple summation or communalisation of the thoughts of individuals, are dominant at a low level. Psychoanalysis teaches us that mental disorders are disturbances of the adaptation to the extant form of society, are regressions to lower stages, whereas dreams

¹ The stratification of higher literary products is somewhat complicated, but is nevertheless analysable. Cf. S. Freud, *Der Wahn und die Träume in W. Jensens Gradiva*, 2nd edition, Vienna and Leipzig, 1912.—*Delusion and Dream: an Interpretation in the Light of Psychoanalysis of Gradiva, a Novel by William Jensen*, Moffat, New York, 1917.—Allen and Unwin, London, 1921.

are normal forms of similar regressions, cut off from motor activity. Even the products of art and literature are based upon regression, though with an upward tending (anagogic) aspect.¹

These regressions coalesce with primitive social ideas. There is an inward connexion between the collectivity (or rather the community) of individual ideas, and the primitive state. This is one of the main pillars of Durkheim's theory of social solidarity.² In his view, the lower form of solidarity is the one based upon or associated with a similarity of the individuals which compose it, and based upon the identity of their ideologies. This is a mechanical or religious solidarity. It is mechanical because it presupposes a propulsive general ideology. It is religious, because religion implies a belief that is accepted in the same interpretation by all the members of a particular community.

To Durkheim's theory, based mainly upon juristic philosophy, and to the general evo-

¹ Cf. H. Silberer, *Probleme der Mystik und ihrer Symbolik*, Vienna and Leipzig, 1914. *Introversion und Wiedergeburt, passim*.—*Problems of Mysticism and its Symbolism*, Moffat, New York, 1917.

² E. Durkheim, *De la division du travail social*, 3rd edition, Paris, 1911.

lutionary theory, psychoanalysis superadds a third. Evolution deals exclusively with self-evident entities. Durkheim speaks only of institutions, and does not aim at a more intimate comparison between the world of individual thought and the world of social thought. This gap is filled in by psychoanalysis, which thus furnishes the most valuable support to Durkheim's sociological conception.

Psychoanalysis furnishes interesting aid to Durkheim's criticism of Spencer's classification of society. Durkheim's "mechanical solidarity" does not correspond to the Spencerian "militant society." Centralisation is already a beginning of specialisation, a beginning of the solidarity that is founded on the division of labour. The primitiveness of society is characterised by uniformity of ideologies, and not by warlike institutions. Psychoanalysis secured this result by ascertaining and stressing the contents of the mind, and thus led to a more immanent and steadfast theory of social evolution. Analytical research has shown that the fundamental complexes exercise an influence in the social structures that are most important to organisation, in religions for instance. Thus the root of primitive social homogeneity is not to be found in militarist

centralisation,¹ but in some sort of "primal unity" in which there has subsequently taken place a differentiation of the individuals from one another and from society.

This view is concreted in the detailed results of psychoanalytical study. They show us that the leading material of homogeneity and fixation, of the mechanical socio-individual parallelism, consists of sexuality. Now, to speak with crude simplicity, if there be one thing antecedent to the individual and to society, one thing which embraces within itself the potency both of individual and of society, it is the "germ plasm," the sexual part of mankind, the "species." It is the species, too, which remains the identical element in individual and society. From the species issues the new individual which, during the first years of life, apart from his ego rudiment, reminds us so strongly of primitive man. The specious plasticity and the inner fixity of primitive men are reflected in the manifold psychical constructions of the neuroses and the psychoses, with their unmistakable mimicry of the primitive.

The further interpretation of sexuality supplies much that is new and important. In

¹ The psychoanalytical significance of militarism will be briefly discussed in the sequel.

the light of psychoanalysis, the desire for incestuous sexual activity would seem to be general and central. Oedipus is the most noted hero in the sagas of all ages. C. G. Jung maintains that the only reality in the incest wish is the trend, the reversion and the introversion. This may be more or less true. There can, however, be no doubt, that the incest tendency is either the most pregnant form or else the most expressive symbol of the reversion from the individual and social being into the being of the species. Psychoanalysis testifies to the effect that the manifestation of this universal wish, of the struggle that is carried on against it, and of the resultant compromises, constitutes the most widely diffused content of collective ideas, and is at the same time the chief sustainer of homogeneity.

The relationship to the family is obviously associated with the incest motif. First of all, we have maternal incest as the type of all incestuous trends, influencing the relationship of the son to the father. Here a complication arises. The incest wish is in itself perfectly simple; but the relationship to the father simultaneously exhibits the twofold characters of love and hatred, and is thus ambivalent. In the various individual and

social psychical products, however, it exhibits a uniformity almost equal to that of the incest wish. Its increased lability¹ is connected with the circumstance that it has somewhat less to do with the species and somewhat more to do with social organisation.

Ambivalence, psychical conflict, repression, projection, and symbolisation, as psychical forms; modified forms of sexual partial impulses, and the coexistent ego impulses, as psychical contents—all demand further consideration. As will appear later, these phenomena are of social origin. This, however, does not by any means signify that they cannot manifest themselves as parts of the ideology of a whole community in default of the influence of an external (more powerful) community. Through the similarity of individuals, through the mechanical uniformity which is the outcome of their interrelations, their ideas are simply welded together to form collective ideas, of course with certain modifications. Repression is not consciously effected by any collective organ; it applies to the primitive community no less than to

¹ For the quadruple form in which the ideas of god and devil may represent the relationship between father and son, cf. Ernest Jones, *Der Alptraum*, etc., Leipzig and Vienna, 1912, p. 81.

the individual members of that community. With progressive differentiation, this conformity tends to disappear, persisting most conspicuously in respect of the previously enumerated psychical contents. Similar is the behaviour of projection; and also of symbolisation, which may be broadly viewed as a stabilisation of projection. In accordance with Otto Rank's train of reasoning, the most characteristic feature of the symbol is its independence of individuals.¹ This is an empirical truth, proved by psychoanalytical researches. From these we learn, in addition, that the dominion of the species, that homogeneity, can maintain itself, not alone directly in the impulses, but also in their general and systematic modifications. Advancing somewhat further in our psychological study, we find that it is impossible to subsume the lower and the higher stages of society in two categories merely, that of a free life on the one hand, and that of repression on the other. We find that we must not neglect certain intermediate qualitative elements.

To avoid misunderstanding, I must point out that collective symbolisations, as allegorical guiding ideas, must not be confused

¹ Otto Rank, *Psychoanalytische Beiträge zur Mythenforschung*, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1919, p. 37.

with the purely emblematic technical symbols which flourish concomitantly with civilisation. But this discussion would lead beyond the limits of the present work.

Let us turn, therefore, to the greater unities among collective ideas. Myth and fable are typical in this respect. Magic, religion, thought-trends, are of a different character, for all these have an economic basis. They are closely connected with the organisation of society, and they therefore fail to exhibit any notable parallelism with the individual. Myth and fable, on the other hand, are the negatives of cultural development.¹ Myth is a more or less disguised wish fulfilment. The writings of Rank, in especial, have drawn attention to the close analogy between myth and the individual's dreams. This analogy is much more perfect, though perhaps less fruitful, than the analogy between religion and compulsion neurosis. The analogy between the myth and the dream finds expression in analytical literature far more readily and consistently, but arouses fewer problems. What is the meaning of this? In the life of the individual, the dream has no organic or positive part to play. Its function largely consists in a discharge, in the relief of a sort of psychical

¹ Rank, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

congestion. Its essential nature, as we might infer from its physiological determinants, is to withdraw the dreamer from his actual environment. Similarly with myth—if we understand by this term, not anything which can be called a religious conviction in the narrower sense, but something which has the nature of saga. Myth is a copy of the dream, inasmuch as myth looks wholly towards the past, and is “titanic” (Silberer). The persistent analogy between dream and myth affords additional proof of the primitive, specific unity of the individual and society. This furnishes additional justification for our sociological interpretation. Passing to consider fable, we find that Rank sharply distinguishes it from myth. It is positively ethical, “anagogical,” from the civic point of view; it is conservative, though not retrograde; it stresses the material factor. Consequently, to find a replica of fable in the individual would be less easy. Perhaps certain fantasies, conscious fantasies for the most part, relating to an upward movement within existing conditions, deserve consideration in this connexion. Here, however, the exceptions will be notable, for the very reason that fable is less the product of the spirit of the species than of society as a whole.

We may note how the analogy with the dream loses its significance in so far as simple myth gives place to structurally important social phenomena. Ernest Jones demonstrates the "communalisation" of nightmare as a belief in ghosts, but forthwith proceeds to researches into matters comparatively remote from the individual, dealing with belief in the devil and with epidemics of witchcraft.

Anent the before-mentioned parallelism, we encounter in extant analytical literature (though only in isolated cases) allusions to the formal problem of function, to the problem of the normal and the pathological. In the comparison between religion and compulsion neurosis, it is less conspicuous; although the view of those who imagined that religion could be dismissed as pure aberration because many of its theses were erroneous, has now become obsolete. When we consider the analogy between paranoia and the philosophical systems, this particular point assumes great importance. A philosophical system does not possess a preeminently social character; that wherein it is distinguished from the delusions of the paranoiac is to be found in its comparative accuracy and in the attendant circumstances. As we might have expected, psychoanalytical re-

search has proved less illuminating here than in the case of religion and of compulsion neurosis. In this connexion, Freud, after his parallel study of the taboo religion and of the modern "taboo disease," came to the conclusion that the neurotic is more altruistic and social than the primitive. Moreover, in the neurotic, the part played by sexual components is greater, and the impulses undergo more extensive transformation.¹ All this may be associated with the fact that our neurotic has undergone greater differentiation from the community (sociality being here by no means identical with social homogeneity), and that the system of repression is most powerful and persistent in the sexual domain. Once more we find confirmation of the view that the "species" displays amazing constancy, not only in its direct form, but likewise in its veiled and blurred form.

Hitherto, for the most part, primitive social ideas, and not the regressions of contemporary society, have been compared with neurotic regressions. The reason has doubtless been that the individual, however much he may tower over the crowd, has been compelled by the laws of sex life to preserve the purely

¹ Freud, *Totem und Tabu*, Leipzig and Vienna, 1913, pp. 65, et seq.—*Totem and Taboo*, Routledge, London, 1919.

specific qualities far more perfectly than any social group has been compelled to preserve them. Nevertheless, Freud has made a profound study of the war psychosis that has been so prevalent during recent tragical years. He found that the hidden regression of that psychosis ran broadly parallel with regression in the ailing individual.¹

As far as concerns socio-individual parallelism, the main result of psychoanalysis may, therefore, be summed up as follows. Whereas, hitherto, the idea of a mechanical solidarity based upon similarity has been a somewhat anæmic schema, and liable to misunderstanding, psychoanalysis has now filled in the outline with a living psychological content.

¹ Freud, *Zeitgemässes über Krieg und Tod*, Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre, IV, Vienna, 1918, p. 504.

CHAPTER THREE

BEGINNINGS OF CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

LIKE the individual, society, the fact of association, has its origin in the species, in the germ plasm. Association arises out of sexuality. This aspect of sexuality may be termed altruistic, in contradistinction to that which works on behalf of resistance to society and tends towards dissociation. Cooperation for the acquisition of food is secondary, and is the most important step in the differentiation of society from the species. Its existence, though perhaps only in the germ, must be presupposed in the stage from which psychoanalytical research takes its start, the stage of the primitive horde.¹ This is a family in the widest sense of the term, a family in which the father rules while the younger males must obey and are

¹ Cf. Freud, *Totem und Tabu*; also T. Reik, *Probleme der Religionspsychologie*, I, *Das Ritual*, Vienna, 1919, *passim*.

compelled by the patriarch to abstain from intercourse with the women of the horde. Such an organisation unquestionably rests upon a sexual foundation, but only in the sign of the ego impulses. Neither its origin nor its characteristics have been fully elucidated, but psychoanalysis has already sketched the emergence of cultural development from this stage. The psychoanalytical view runs as follows. It may have been a general occurrence that the young adult males, the brethren of the horde, driven by their sexual impulse and by a certain primitively anarchical impulse towards freedom, shattered the rising social power with their own physical power. They killed the father, devoured him, and took possession of the women. Oedipus, therefore, was something more than the chief figure of mythology; he was a widespread reality. Parricide and incest are the two chief sins. They constitute original sin, which Christ the Son, through His Passion, and symbolically becoming the victim of anthropophagy, atones before God the Father.

How did original sin become a sin? What happened after the murder of the father and after the break-up of the organisation? There did not result, not permanently at any rate, the development of a community based upon

equal rights and upon promiscuity. For one reason or another, the young men reestablished the old condition of affairs, characterised by patriarchal authority and the prohibition of incest. Exogamy became the form of sexual activity, and upon the position of the father a social institution and a religion were established (totemism). Why did this change come about? Freud refers to a belated obedience, to which Rank likewise alludes as a mythical motif.¹ The significance of this is, that in the act of parricide only one tendency of their minds was dominant, whilst the other pole of their ambivalent attitude was temporarily repressed. Subsequently, however, the repressed trend once more gained the upper hand, doubtless through the influence of the new condition of affairs. We might perhaps imagine that the brethren recognised themselves "not to be sufficiently advanced" to organise the horde without a patriarch. But this explanation would be too crudely rationalistic. Freud assumes that the brothers themselves wished to become fathers, and consequently came to honour, as the embodiment of the approved system, the father they had overthrown as a personal foe. In this form, of course, the matter becomes some-

¹ Freud, *op. cit.*; Reik, *op. cit.*, pp. 157, et seq.

what too automatic, and the interpretation is inadequate.

If we contemplate the state of affairs more generally, and no longer as an isolated case, we find that the parricide was a shattering, a temporary regression, of the extant social organisation, and must have had a more specific cause than the general psychical state of the young males. For in the latter case the phenomena would have perpetually recurred in a revolt of the new sons against the new fathers. Even though the aforesaid specific cause should elude us, it will be evident that the new conditions created by expiation must be notably distinguished from the old conditions which preceded the parricide. Now this difference can have been nothing else than that to which Freud himself refers, namely, exogamy, and the beginnings of social integration. The old dominion of the father had been broken, but the destructive tendency, after its partial victory, was mastered by a new method of organisation. The primitive horde did not break up into new primitive hordes, but grew to form a more composite community, wherein a number of fathers possessing equal rights continued to live. Out of the primitive and still in large part physical patriarchal organisation, there developed a

social patriarchal organisation. Both Freud and Reik emphasise the importance of the cooperation of the brethren, a cooperation which persists after the new stabilisation. Reik, in especial, draws attention to the fact that the son who has in his turn become a father may conjecture that his own father has returned in the shape of a new-born son. At least the appearance of the son compels him to assume a defensive attitude, and henceforward in his own interest to recognise paternal authority.

This state of affairs becomes the kernel of totemism and of the consequent ritual. Totemism is the sanction of exogamy, and is the potential repudiation of incest. It is the expression of the principle that those who are members of a narrower community must not enter into sexual relations. The animal which is the symbol of the clan, the animal which the members of the totem-clan are forbidden to hunt, represents the father. But as part of the ritual of the totemistic religion we have the slaying and eating of the animal which constitutes the totem. This occurs only on certain feast days, and serves to strengthen the cohesion of the members of the totem-clan. The revival of the repressed and forgotten parricide does not take place in order

to break up the organisation once again, but in order to consolidate it by the symbolical repetition of its genesis. The subsequent ramifications of the religious systems (and in part likewise of the systems of magic) are manifestations of a similar kind brought about by further repression, fixation, and projection. Important are Reik's statements concerning the couvade and the puberal rites. The couvade, the symbolical pretence of illness on the part of the husband during the wife's pregnancy, aims at keeping the husband away from his wife and from his new-born child. Its purpose is to prevent the man's killing his son as the "returning father." But the separation of the husband from the pregnant wife is a radiation of the incest inhibition. The most important feature of the puberal rites is the withdrawal from woman and the family, this being a fixation, as it were a compulsion neurosis, which is a replica of the incest prohibition. At the same time, there is associated with these rites the adoption into the secret society of the males, and this signifies the young man's acceptance into the band of the brethren who are united against the father. The imitation of the old deeds, and the consequent reaction, thus fuse one with another, just as

in the compromise formations of the individual there is a fusion of tendencies with repressions. From the social standpoint, this ritual resembles the totem-meal which assumes the burden of original sin, but it has an opposite purpose. Moreover, we must be careful to avoid thinking that the system of these religious compromise formations actually and decisively overcame the original antisocial primitiveness. In the next chapter we shall undertake a fuller consideration of the significance of repression.

Among all these researches, especially illuminating is that which reveals the connexion between the father and the social order. Here psychoanalysis once more confirms Durkheim's sociology. According to this writer's theory of religion and totemism¹—a theory to which Freud pays little attention in his book—the idea of the saint, of the supernatural, which underlies totemism no less than other forms of religion, is nothing else than the manifestation of the environing and guiding society in the consciousness of the individual. In the society of primitive solidarity, the society which rests upon the uniformity of

¹ Durkheim, *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, Paris, 1912, passim.—*The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1915.

the component individuals, the main integrating force is some sort of idea which is identical in the minds of all the individual members. Formally speaking, it is the idea of the society itself.

Durkheim concerns himself little about psychical content, for his outlook is pre-eminently sociological. From him, therefore, we cannot learn whether the content of the matter is that suggested above. Psycho-analytical study gives a very different picture. The father is the substantial representative of society, the person with whom the individual comes directly into contact. The first person with whom a child comes into contact in addition to the mother, the one who incorporates the first and most important inhibitions and commands of society, is the father. Both the suppression of incest, and exogamic integration, are effected under his sign. Now according to psychoanalytical results, the victory of the father upon the wreckage of parricide is not wholly analogous in its significance to the victory of primitive social solidarity over the repudiation of any kind of solidarity. It already conceals a kernel of progress in the direction of a solidarising division of labour. There is no such thing as complete absence of solidarity. Incestuous and un-

bridled sexuality, the "titanic" state, the dominion of the species, signify the typical primitive solidarity. The organisation that is realised under the aegis of paternal authority carries with it already the beginnings of the division of labour. It does this all the more surely inasmuch as exogamy and the coming into touch with alien individualities are already displayed at this stage, and these in especial serve to set the forces of differentiation at work. They contain an element which directly conflicts with patriarchal dominion in the primitive horde. There gradually ensues a cleavage between father and society. In the course of cultural revolution and in virtue of a more complicated process of education, this cleavage grows ever more conspicuous.

In this respect, too, psychoanalysis supports Durkheim's views as against those of Spencer. It shows that militarist society is not the lowest form of society, since in militarist society we already find the first elements of the division of labour, in virtue of which atomisation is replaced by differentiation, and merging in the species is replaced by integration. Psychoanalysis, too, is competent to answer the question, how a community can keep itself holy (even though it does so unconsciously). According to Durk-

heim's idea, the individual members simply regard their society as holy, and because of their homogeneity, their faith becomes general. But Durkheim's fundamental notion is that a collective idea in every case possesses a quasi-independent character. This persistence of the idea of a supernatural quality, its retention in the communal consciousness, would be incomprehensible, had not the idea some concrete sustainer, to constitute no mere empty sign, but an essential content. Psychoanalysis discloses this sustainer; it is the father. The "father" of the society, the totem-animal, or tribal god, cannot by any possible means be deduced psychologically from the idea of society—though Durkheim does not seem to have fully realised how significant this difficulty is. But when we understand the significance of the father-*imago*, the difficulty disappears. Furthermore, the totem-meal, as an act for the regeneration of religious solidarity, demands an explanatory key, which is supplied by psychoanalysis in the form of affective ambivalence and of the father complex. Psychoanalysis is unable to furnish a complete explanation of the way in which the physical power of the strongest male member of the family became transformed into the predominantly moral power of society

and its authorities. Nevertheless, in this matter likewise, psychoanalysis can so far perform its task in that it fills in the outlines of formal sociology with the requisite psychological content. Working independently, Freud and Durkheim studied totemism, and achieved results which, as we have shown, practically supplement one another. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that psychoanalysis, approaching the matter from without, supplements sociological research. Probably the agreement will ultimately prove at once more subtle and more profound. In any case, the extant results serve on the one hand to confirm Durkheim's sociological theories, and on the other to give enhanced weight to psychoanalytical results. We shall see that this conclusion is strengthened by the study of more immediately practical problems.

CHAPTER FOUR

SOCIAL ORGANISATION AND THE INDIVIDUAL

AT the outset, psychoanalysis noted the influence which the social environment exercises upon the deeper strata of the individual's mind. Although, in accordance with its primary aim, the attention of psychoanalysis was concentrated upon the organisation of the individual mind and not upon the organisation of society, society came to occupy an increasingly large place in psychoanalytical material. The subsequent development of the science made it possible to attempt the solution of problems far transcending those which concern the individual alone.

The psychoanalytical view of the mind is helpful in the elucidation of social relationships, were it only because psychoanalysts contemplate the mind in purely dynamic fashion, conceiving it as a system of action, and refusing to commit themselves to any physiological interpretation of the phenomena

they investigate. But where we have to do with actions, there a decisive influence must be exercised by that portion of the environment which is associated with the individual mind, not physiologically, but without direct contact, in virtue of actions which take place in the environment. This portion of the environment is society, whose role in the mental life of the individual must not be interpreted as if its working were of a simple and obvious character. Everyone is aware that a considerable proportion of our actions and thoughts concerns our fellow men, and this truth may be confirmed by detailed investigations. But psychoanalysis has wider implications. It discloses the relationships of the individual mind, of its structure and nature, to society. In the psychoanalytical view, society does not simply supply a content for the psychical framework, but actually constructs this framework, and it does so in relation, not only to the moral but also to the mental constitution of the individual.

Durkheim, discussing a fundamentally different topic and setting out from an entirely different starting-point, comes to the same conclusion. He ascribes a social origin, not only to religion, but also to the ideas of space, time, causality, and the group. His socio-

logism is more epistemological, whereas that of psychoanalysis is more psychological. This is because the movement of which Durkheim is the spokesman has to do with form rather than with content, whereas psychoanalysis deals with content rather than with form. Nevertheless, the analogy grows striking when we recall that analysis deduces the unconscious, the censorship, sublimation, in a word, the "autonomous" factors of the mental life of the individual, from the influence of society. Significant is the way in which psychoanalysis develops the views of Pierre Janet, which are so closely akin to those of the psychoanalysts. Janet, too, declares that psychical disturbances are determined by a reduction of adaptation to the environment, of psychical tension, of the "reality function"; he, likewise, concerns himself with an abnormal restriction of consciousness. Psychoanalysis provides a social content for the "outer world," that to which the individual has to adapt himself. The psychological formalism of Janet (a doctrine whose importance must on no account be underestimated), and the epoch-making sociological formalism of Durkheim, are both furnished by psychoanalysis with a significant content.

All these doctrines build on the same prin-

principle. They build upon the principle which is used by Durkheim with such logical consistency and generality, upon the principle that the non-physical demands of society become, in the individual, factors divorced from immediacy.¹ Psychoanalysis does especially good service here, for it breaks the vicious circle of priority or conditionality, which has led to so many vain verbal disputes. It effects a fruitful application of the principle that society exercises a formative influence upon the individual, while remaining an essentially individuo-psychological discipline. Obviously this likewise involves certain shortcomings, but such is the fate of every bold movement. In all healthy division of labour there must be a supreme grouping of individual data which renders inevitable inadequacies harmless.

One of the first and most important acquisitions of our new branch of science was the way in which it paid due attention to unconscious mental phenomena. It has done this systematically and uncompromisingly, never at haphazard. The idea of the unconscious had obtained the freedom of the city in the literary world before the days of psy-

¹ "The inhibitions are taken up into the mind," Silberer, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

choanalysis, but it had remained the sport of occultist triflers and intellectualist chatterers, with the aid of a few minor metaphysical developments. This unscientific and superficial aspect of the theory was cleared out of the way by psychoanalysis. With the aid of this method we have achieved a real knowledge of the unconscious, and have also secured a conception, no less essential though not yet sufficiently precise, of the foreconscious. In the realm of the foreconscious are such elements of the unconscious psyche as are no more than temporarily in the unconscious; such as frequently or regularly cross the threshold of consciousness; such as are obliterated from consciousness, not on account of the nature of their thought content, but for accidental and temporary reasons. Those elements, on the other hand, which have been permanently forgotten, or which have never entered the conscious mind, those elements which cannot cross the threshold of consciousness, constitute the unconscious. No matter that there is a less sharply defined boundary between the foreconscious and the unconscious, than there is between the conscious and all that temporarily or permanently lies beyond the threshold. In such classifications, the decisive consideration is not the

extent of the cleavage but the criterion of differentiation.

Psychoanalysis regards the existence of the foreconscious as self-evident, and concentrates its attention on the unconscious. Primarily this is because the psychology of the unconscious is closely associated with the neuroses. This is not the only reason. Let us consider the social bearing of these conceptions. What have we to understand by the statement that one of my psychical processes is conscious? To put the matter crudely, this means nothing else than that I can express it in words, that by means of speech I can communicate it to others in a way they will be able to understand. Whatever physiological factors and accompaniments consciousness may possess, direct psychological analysis can attach itself only to the factor of the intelligible. I do not relate everything that I think, but the starting-point of any thought process cannot but be my capacity to relate it should I so desire. For the present we make no attempt to discuss the significance of such a desire. Beyond question, it is not the same thing to be able to do something and to desire to do it. We can take our stand upon this difference. The conscious is what we are able to communicate to others, what we are

able to disclose to society ; it is what can be adequately incorporated in speech, that is to say, in a system of extant social conventions.¹

The difference between the conscious and the foreconscious is inconsiderable. It is the difference between actuality and potentiality ; a difference which does not concern the structure of the mind, but depends solely upon the momentary state of circumstances and the individual. In so far as the foreconscious occupies different relationships from those occupied by the conscious, the difference concerns only the formless situation and not the essentially operative structure of society.

Very different is it with the unconscious. Here the decisive matter is, not that the unconscious cannot come to play a salient part in the psyche (for this assertion is only true within limits), but that the unconscious cannot present itself before society. Whatever disturbances or excitations the unconscious may produce within me, I have no power to give even approximate expression to the workings of my unconscious, or to

¹ It is possible that to think of anything, necessarily involves the incipient, rudimentary, unnoted utterance of the relevant words.

recount these workings to other persons. Psychoanalysts formulate this by saying that the unconscious is nonsocial. This must not be interpreted as implying an individuality of the unconscious, as implying that the unconscious is peculiarly differentiated in different persons; such an assertion would apply less correctly to the unconscious than to the conscious. What has to be understood is that the unconscious, even if it be identical in a number of persons, never manifests itself among them. The unconscious may play an important part as indicating a community of common ancestry, but it does not disclose itself in the working life of the community.

Investigation shows that this contrast really exists, that the various unconsciouss do, in fact, resemble one another closely, just as there is a striking resemblance between the above-described individual and mass manifestations of the unconscious. The contrast is already known to us; we discern in it the contrast between the species and society. If we may venture on a bolder simplification, we shall infer that the unconscious, while possessing the characteristics of the species, is non-social—and at the same time, of course, nonindividual.

Before we pass from nonsociality to a possible antisociality, we have to consider psychoanalysis proper, to consider its aim of rendering the unconscious conscious. The purpose of psychoanalysis is to throw light on the unconscious elements of the psyche, to place them at the disposal of the conscious. The means whereby we do this is the displacement from its normal surroundings of that which we have to analyse, and the interpretation of the isolated and masked manifestations of the unconscious by comparing and systematising these. The characteristic view that psychoanalysis signifies a favouring of the unconscious, signifies its enfranchisement into the realm of action, is utterly false. The analyst aims merely at rendering it possible to recognise the unconscious, at making it accessible to society, and in especial to the physician and to the conscious ego. I must point out that in many cases that which is unconscious is not an individual idea, but the relationship between conscious (or fore-conscious) ideas. As a rule, however, it is this very matter of a relationship which puts the analyst on the track of the hidden psychical contents. In any case, this may serve to make the reader understand that we do not look upon the unconscious as a substantial

entity, as if it were the one and only reality.¹ The unconscious represents merely a transition to that form of reality which is not the reality of the consciousness, of the categories, but is equivalent to the reality of the raw material. There appears in the unconscious, as raw material, everything which in the conscious was an organic, formal, grammatical construction.² The unconscious works only with the coexistent; the relationship of the alternative, of the contrast, is unknown to it. In association therewith, the unconscious has the quality of mobility (forming associations in freedom from outward determination); and the quality of timelessness, in that it neglects the circumstances of the outer world.³ All this agrees admirably with the theories expounded by Durkheim. The unconscious is nonsocial. Psychoanalysis aims at replacing it by a social equivalent. Of course this does not mean solely an approximation of the unconscious to society, but the converse as well. Not only, however, does the un-

¹ Cf. P. Bjerre, *Bewusstsein kontra Unterbewusstsein*, *Jahrbuch für Psychoanalyse*, V, p. 697.

² Concerning the latent content of dreams, cf. Freud, *Die Traumdeutung*, 4th edition, Vienna and Leipzig, 1916, p. 247.—*The Interpretation of Dreams*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1913, p. 260.

³ Freud, *Das Unbewusste*, *Neurosenlehre*, IV, p. 319.

conscious protest against this ; but in society, likewise, we discern a strong tendency to resistance, despite the fact that the analytic trend, as we shall learn more fully in the sequel, is predominantly social. For the moment, let it suffice to say that this antagonism between the unconscious and society would seem to be of no merely static character, but presumably to possess a dynamic and militant quality.

The content of the unconscious consists, in fact, of wishes the realisation of which, and even the expression of which, is forbidden by society. The study of mass ideas and of the beginnings of civilisation has familiarised us with these wishes. They are forbidden forms of sexuality and of allied trends which are regarded with disapproval. In respect of the repression of these complexes, in respect of the way in which they are rendered unconscious, modern man and the totemist resemble one another far more closely than in respect of other branches of their lives. This persistence is a grave problem. No less grave is the problem, what really causes repression ; why not only the realisation of the wishes, but also their expression, and even their very entry into consciousness, are forbidden ; and why this process is effected so forcibly that the

relevant complexes are utterly unable to find vent in speech. I shall make no attempt to answer these questions definitively, since my aim is merely one of interpretation. All I wish is to arrange the problems in order of importance.

Let me insist, above all, that there exists in addition to repression an opposite way of checking forbidden actions. I refer to self-critical judgment, which bears the same sort of relationship to repression that repression bears to physical flight from an alarming or loathsome object.¹ It is necessary to draw attention to this conscious, critical judgment, as the other pole within the psychical sphere. Rational reflection finds nothing strange in self-critical judgment; but repression, being a manifestly illogical attitude, seems incomprehensible. Nevertheless, it does not follow that repression is more complicated than self-critical judgment, any more than that the dream is more complicated than waking thought.

Let us dismiss the problem of the persistence of the "nuclear complexes," and turn to that of repression. What is the link between the realisation of the wishes and their expression, the link which psychoanalysis brings

¹ Freud, *Die Verdrängung*, *Neurosenlehre*, IV, p. 279.

so prominently before us? Unquestionably it is that the expression of the wish keeps it permanently on the agenda, and thus prevents its defeat, which has to be effected once and for all. But this is not the whole matter. The unconscious wish is felt, but its influence does not extend beyond the limits of the individual. It does not establish any barriers between human beings. We know, indeed, that persons can collaborate even when they have sharp differences upon matters of feeling and upon matters of opinion. But this can only take place in a comparatively evolved community; it is impossible in primitive communities, where cooperation is rigid, mechanical, and based upon homogeneity. Among primitive men, cooperation is physically enforced, or is enforced in a quasi physical manner, with a uniformity of impulsive rhythm which resembles the physical. In the earlier stages of human life, impulse is still very close to action, and solidarity cannot tolerate any hostile acts that stand so close to realisation. The expression of antisocial wishes would imply anarchy and atomisation; the social organisation is inelastic; solidarity, therefore, represses any such expression. The assumption lies ready to hand that in the primitive type of solidarity it was found

essential to forbid the mere mention of such a wish, and to forbid no less the mere thinking about it. Its public discussion would involve the expression of opposing views. Where the inhibition must be unconditional and general, where it must be entirely uncontradicted, the inhibited wish must be left wholly undiscussed. For either it would be a cause of disturbance, and is therefore repressed, or else, being entirely superfluous, it cannot even be formulated. Nor can we suppose that that of which it is forbidden to speak can remain permanently in the consciousness. Mechanical solidarity and the dominion of collective ideas impose uniformity even in the realm of consciousness, upon the very surface of social contact. Moreover, we are concerned with things which have no place in everyday life, with things, any mention of which would break up the mass unity.

Durkheim contends that the chief characteristic of primitive solidarity was that the prevailing law of primitive society was a penal law (*droit répressif*). Repression, too, has as its essence a forcible breaking-in of the individual to fit him for the service of the community. In the case of offences against property, punishment came into play; in the case of sexual offences, repression was at work.

The system is the same—quasi-physical, rigid, and uniform.

If we recall that repression is not the most primitive condition of all, but the one which follows upon the condition in which impulses were dominant, we shall realise that repression, genetically regarded, stands between unrestraint and self-critical judgment, and that in certain respects it has closer affinities with unrestraint. Repression, in fact, is far from being a final settlement of antisocial wishes. It merely carries them forward to account, without destroying them, as psychoanalysis has shown on innumerable occasions. Freud writes that the repressed material continues to thrive in the darkness.¹ He says also: "No one can be slain *in absentia* or *in effigie*."² The inadequacy of repression is, as Durkheim notes, precisely analogous to the fragility of mechanical solidarity. Under certain conditions, we can see in both the fulfilment of the poet's words:

Majestic doom, interwoven with creation,
That he who strives for power shall by power be destroyed.
Rulers, in the end, must bow their necks beneath the yoke,
And he to-day is lord who yesterday was rebel.³

¹ Freud, loc. cit.

² Zur Dynamik der Uebertragung, Zentralblatt für Psychologie, anno II, p. 481.

³ F. Werfel, Spruch eines gestürzten Saturnus.

But the term analogy is by no means apposite, seeing that repression, and a mechanical solidarity which is dominant in virtue of the mass idea, are respectively individual and social formulas of the same institution.

The most highly developed form of the overcoming of antisocial wishes is self-critical judgment, the critical rejection of and the refusal to satisfy an impulse. This is compatible with discussion, and is indeed conditioned by discussion. Self-critical judgment presupposes the consciousness that the wish actually exists, and that its control demands a certain trouble. In so far as the wish gradually declines and disappears, its expression becomes purposeless; but it may of course persist as a topic of discussion.

The system of self-critical judgment belongs to a social structure entirely different from that to which the system of repression belongs. The system of society based upon self-critical judgment is elastic; incipient onslaughts are not able to threaten its stability. Its cohesion cannot be ascribed to any coercive mass ideas, inasmuch as all self-criticism is in reality social criticism which destroys homogeneity. The social contrast to self-critical judgment is dogma; its social correlate is conviction. I must refer, in especial, to S.

Ferenczi's psychoanalytical publications.¹ He gives the name of conquest to the success of authority and of the moralisation that is based on authority; and he gives the name of conviction to the governance that is based upon the making of things accessible.² Conviction is a fact of such a nature that it stands equally remote from authority and from nihilism—not half way between them. Incontestably, unfaith or scepticism often intrudes between faith and conviction, but this must not be confused with the development of faith into conviction. Whereas the social expression of scepticism is anarchy, the social expression of conviction is the union of free individuals. This brings us back to Durkheim's conception, for Durkheim holds that evolution tends towards organic solidarity. Such a solidarity conditions a legal structure wherein contractual law (*droit restitutif*) prevails, a system based on the division of labour. Now division of labour implies the existence of diverse individuals, for whom the bond of union is not a mass rhythm but the association of their various working functions. In these

¹ *The Progress of Psychoanalysis* [Magyar], Budapest, 1920, pp. 22, et seq.

² In Magyar, as well as in English and in the Latin tongues, the word "conviction" is formed from the same root as "victory."

circumstances there cannot, of course, be any dominant dogma, any conquest and repression; but there can be free discussion, conviction, and the reasoned condemnation of antisocial tendencies. It is, however, necessary to reiterate that this can be fully achieved only in the ideal perfection of organic solidarity.

No detailed proof need be offered of the assertion that self-critical judgment, when it can be achieved, is more effective than repression. Repression has no annihilating force whatever, whereas self-critical judgment seeks out every particle of the condemned material, endeavouring to detach it from its connexions. Self-critical judgment does not leave the unconscious intact as a solid block, and it is therefore able to avail itself of the methods of dissociation and canalisation for the purpose of rendering the unconscious harmless. Psychoanalytical methods of treatment give a practical demonstration of this. Repression, in so far as it has not been completely successful, leads to the thriving of certain constructions wherein the repressed complex still manifests itself as a unified entity; but nothing of this kind ensues upon self-critical judgment. Moreover, self-critical judgment is not subject to any liaison with the complex, such as

often gives a quaint colouring to repression, as we are apt to see in the neuroses. The totemistic organisation founded upon incest and parricide is, qua content, permeated with incest and parricide. Release from these trends begins only at a later stage of development, in the course of which differentiation and criticism, however slowly, secure breathing space.

Self-critical judgment, far from concealing a consecration of the unconscious, is verily the liberation of the individuality from the thralldom of the unconscious. In repression, not only the repressed material, but likewise and necessarily the process of repression, become unconscious. Deliberate attempts at repression have practically no significance, or at most are significant as temporary deflections. The authority which is at work on the borderline between the unconscious and the foreconscious, by psychoanalysts termed the censor, is itself unconscious. We may compare it with the press censorship, as the important organ of a social dictatorship; the actual working of this press censorship is concealed from men's eyes, although its existence makes itself felt. As a rule and for organic reasons the press censorship is arbitrary, pursues its own ends, and serves

partisan aims. The same may be said of the endopsychic censor, for this protects the conscious against the unconscious, without helping the conscious to a victory over the unconscious. For the censor is in great part a denial of the conscious, a denial of the social interchange of ideas.

As ultimate outcome we find that psychoanalysis contributes to the theory of mechanical solidarity and to the theory of organic solidarity something more than a mere supply of psychical contents. The schemata of repression and self-critical judgment, of faith, unfaith, and conviction, the discovery of the unconscious, have thrown a new and clearer light on the relationship of the individual to the social organism. We must now consider certain important details.

Psychoanalysis has drawn its main materials from the study of the slighter and purely functional mental disorders, from the study of psychoneuroses. The background of these disorders is formed by sexual wishes of an antisocial character. These have been repressed, but have not been destroyed. On the contrary, they have become intensified; and concomitantly with this intensification there has occurred an accentuation of repression. The repressed trends break out in various

groups of symptoms, some of which are physical, though to a predominant extent they are mental. These syndromes and compromise formations, although they are far from being tantamount to the conquest of power by the repressed wishes, greatly reduce the social value of the patient. The repressed trends achieve this much, that the subject neglects or abandons social relationships. Furthermore, the repressed trends secure partial satisfaction along various underground channels. Anxiety is to be regarded as a substitute for repressed sexual libido, the anxiety being in part a direct expression of the libido energy, but in part the expression of dread of the punishments inflicted by society. Here, then, we encounter a regression to repression, a regression to mechanical solidarity, at a stage of evolution wherein organic solidarity and self-critical judgment should prevail. At the same time, however, this regression is a relapse into the gratification of the condemned libido, which secures fulfilment unchanged in its essence, though mutilated and caricatured in point of form. Psychoanalysts speak of these disguises as idealisation, in contradistinction to sublimation, in which there occurs an integral transference of the impulsive energies into useful activities.

Idealisation is characterised by the morphological covering up of the repressed material, with which it is therefore congruent ;¹ whereas sublimation involves a thoroughgoing elaboration of the repressed material. The hysterical paroxysm is invariably the mask for an act of coitus. In the compulsion neuroses we often encounter the extreme case, in which the patient imperturbably carries out some perverse practice, while to satisfy his conscience he rigidly abstains from some associated or analogous but harmless and insignificant form of activity, turning the matter off as it were with a jest. A part of every neurosis is the clinging to it, the "will to disease," the "flight towards disease." There is a lapse from the level of society to a lower level which is nearer to the level of the species. The essence of the lesser or functional psychoses is the turning away from society, the exclusive concentration upon the ego, in conjunction with the defence of the unconscious, or even capitulation to the unconscious.

Of course this turning away from society must not be described as a form of individualism, which might well transcend the normal life in value. The approximation takes place,

¹ "The neurosis is the negative of the perversion," Freud, *Sexualtheorie*, 3rd edition, Leipzig and Vienna, 1915, p. 30.

not to the individuality, but to the system of a more primitive society. This is shown, among other indications, by the compulsive character which "despite the best intentions in the world" is manifest in every neurosis. It is somewhat less strikingly present in hysteria, where the symptoms are predominantly physical. But the other great psychoneurosis is preeminently termed the compulsion neurosis. Now there are only two kinds of compulsion: the compulsion exercised by our impulses; and the compulsion exercised by a more primitive social environment. Neurotic compulsion contains both forms in varying degrees of intensity, according to the adaptation to extant society—an adaptation which does not require compulsion in the narrower sense of the term.

The content of the neuroses is in conformity with these considerations. The points of contact between the individual and the species, and between society and the species—sexuality and childhood—are here made manifest. Let us first consider childhood, which is more directly interconnected with society.

The mental characteristics of the child are of supreme importance both sociologically and psychologically. In theory this has often been recognised; but psychoanalysis has made of

the theory a working hypothesis, and has boldly attempted to fill in its outlines. The child's environment, that which at first in the majority of instances constitutes for the child the phenomenal form of society, consists mainly of the parents. Thus the central problem is the relationship of the child to the parents. In my account of the matter, I shall speak of male children only, first of all because the available data relate chiefly to boys and because their development is unquestionably more important; and secondly because, as far as the broad lineaments are concerned, what applies to boys applies to girls, *mutatis mutandis*, and allowing for the differences of sex.

Primarily the relationship of the son to the mother is not social, but specifically physiological (birth). The normally apparent incest trend signifies, in part at least, the revival of this relationship, as is proved by the frequent occurrence of birth fantasies. The trend is certainly antisocial, antievolutional. In normal life, however, it does not undergo any independent development; it is sublimated, to constitute a source of energy in the later sexual life, and in the general life. This process of sublimation is apt to be arrested by an excess of maternal tenderness, which

leads to a fixation of the incest trend, and renders inevitable a conflict between that trend and the accentuated repression. Such fixation actually exists in most cases, a phenomenon which is unquestionably one of the causes of the slowness of our evolution and of the irrationality of our behaviour, especially in sexual matters.

As we already know, the father represents the inhibitions and commands of society. Nowadays this identification of the father with society has already become weaker. Whereas society has travelled a long way in the development towards free cooperation, the actual father is still but imperfectly distinguished from the father who was honoured in the form of the totem-animal. The cause of this discrepancy is to be found, not only in the child, not only in the child's eternal primitiveness, but also in the regressive tendencies of the adult, which he is of course able to work off upon the child. The idea of absolute monarchy loses credit notably, when compared with the idea of absolutism in education; but we may rest assured that the relative persistence of the latter helps to retard political progress. Ferenczi warns the socialist leaders that their actions will be paralysed as long as they continue as fathers

to demand for themselves blind respect and servile subjection.¹ Mensendieck likewise censures the irrational behaviour of parents in the domain of permissions and prohibitions, their chief social functions.² The relationship to the parents constitutes the very kernel of the neuroses. I cannot refrain from summarising the account of this matter given by an intelligent youth suffering from compulsion neurosis, for his record has scientific value apart from the immediate psychological interest of the particular case.³

No special qualifications, he writes, are requisite for the practice of the parental profession. The parents bring a child into the world irresponsibly, as an act of special creation. The child is a plaything, which comes into existence without the exercise of its own will, and which is supposed to be grateful for the boon forced upon it. Parent-worship, he adds, is the root of the similar

¹ Ferenczi, *Nervous Symptoms, etc.* [Psychoanalytical Essays, in Magyar], Budapest, 1914, p. 24.—In any case, Marxist socialism is not incompatible with authoritarian dogmatism.

² Zur Technik des Unterrichts und der Erziehung während der psychoanalytischen Behandlung, *Jahrbuch für Psychoanalyse*, V, p. 460.

³ Riklin, Aus der Analyse einer Zwangsneurose, *Jahrbuch für Psychoanalyse*, II, pp. 291, et seq.

tendencies manifest in social life, the root of monarchism and militarism.

The relationship of mutual irresponsibility, whose ethics cannot here be discussed, necessarily produces effects both upon the individual and upon society, for the relationship to the parent has an archetypal character.¹ Psychoanalysis has shown us that hypnosis is a copy of lulling by the mother or of intimidation by the father. We are readily reminded of loyalty, demagogy, and kindred social manifestations.

Psychoanalysis has further demonstrated the determinative influence of other factors operative during childhood, and notably that of sexual traumata. Subsequently Freud was inclined to believe that the basis of the future constitution was formed, not so much by gross sexual traumata, as by the whole course of the sexual life during childhood. This view, far from underestimating the importance of environment and education, is one which takes every environmental and educational element into account. The noxious influences which have no connexion with the parents may be ranged in two classes: (1) Premature and immoderate awakening of sensuality, with consequent fixation; (2) Intensified repression,

¹ Concerning the irresponsibility of children, cf. Mensendieck, *op. cit.*, p. 457.

in association with despotic behaviour towards the child.

We must now sketch the sociological results of psychosexualanalysis; all the threads seem to converge upon this point. This is a difficult field of study, and we cannot as yet boast very exact knowledge of the subject. Indubitably we have to seek in sexuality the essence of that which we have termed "species," that which both the individual and society have produced out of themselves, but which is at the same time a continuous drag upon progress. While it is true that, as the material of sublimation, it constitutes a main factor of evolution and of the great creations, structurally nevertheless, as impulse and as tissue of partial impulses, it is the antagonist of progress.¹ Let us reconsider in a single survey a few of the traits of this "species."

It is characteristic of sexuality that in this domain there is a closer approximation between thought and action than elsewhere. In the field of sex there seems to occur what we may term a short circuit between body and mind.² From this source may well arise

¹ Cf. Silberer, *op. cit.*, *Introversion and Regeneration [Reincarnation or Rebirth]*.

² Concerning the specific role of the sexual organs when

the belief in the omnipotence of thought which is so widely diffused at a primitive stage, the belief which is fundamental both in magic and in compulsion neurosis. In a wider sense, associated therewith is every irrational overvaluation, first of all of the own ego (narcissism—which may have an interesting function in war¹), and secondly of the external sexual object (love). We now have a clue to the reason why in so many fields the restriction and regulation of sexuality are still effected by repression and not by self-critical judgment. We have been glad to accept the idea that we must educate children in a scientific, secular morality; but we are still far from realising that it would be well to enlighten the child sexually, and not to postpone this enlightenment with the utmost caution and for the greatest possible period. For here word and deed are in closest association; here the foundation for self-critical judgment is of the slightest. On the other hand, from the omnipotence of thought and from the energising value of knowledge

in a state of excitement, cf. Freud, *Zur Einführung des Narzissmus*, Jahrbuch, VI, p. 9; *Ueber Sexualität und Zwang*, *ibid.*, p. 13.

¹ He who cannot believe in his own death becomes a hero. Freud, *Ueber Krieg und Tod*, p. 519.—The species, the germ plasm, is in fact immortal!

of sexual things, there is derivable one of the most powerful motive forces of science and research.¹ Science, however, corresponds to the stage of self-critical judgment and of the evolved division of labour.

Another salient characteristic of sexuality is the frequency of perversion. In connexion with the sexual impulse, which appears in so many forms without notable transformation, there frequently occurs the rigid fixation of a single component or of a group of components. The primary source of the phenomenon of perversion is almost always to be found in the earlier years of childhood. Its origin is associated with the fact that during childhood the sexual impulse is present, although sexual functions properly speaking are completely lacking. It is not unlikely that wholesale sexual repression may have intensified the antisocial or dangerous features of the perversions. From our point of view, special attention must be paid to a polar couple of perversions. I refer to the form of sadism and masochism which is not *algolagniac*, but signifies the voluptuousness of domination and of subjection thereto. We must also take into account the preponderant role of homosexual tendencies, a role which has been disclosed by

¹ Cf. Freud, *Totem und Tabu*, p. 81.

psychoanalysis. We are, then, in a position to emphasise the probable significance of sadism and masochism in the social organism. Especially in this connexion, we think of the church and of army life. The repression of these trends, and above all of sadism, likewise has important bearings.

A consideration of the whole question shows that the tenacious persistence of the system of repression in the regulation of sexuality affords evidence of the tenacity of the sexual life itself and of the way in which sexual evolution lags behind the general progress of civilisation. Psychoanalysis has made us familiar with the ideas of "psychosexual parallelism," of "sexual typicalness"—the conception according to which sexuality constitutes at least one of the prime sources of the mind and part of its skeletal framework. The problems thus thrust on our attention naturally lead into the domain of a necessarily general formal psychology, and into the domain of biology. The achievements of psychoanalysis up to the present date are valuable to this extent at any rate. They offer an interesting counterpart to the economico-materialistic mysticism of Marxist doctrine, and are less one-sided than this. Yet more important is the light psychoanalysis has

thrown upon the problem of social organisation, the demonstration of the evolutionary disharmony of society. Psychoanalysis alone has rendered possible a systematic study of the attitude of society towards sexuality. Freud describes that attitude as a mixture of lasciviousness and prudery.¹ The need for psychoanalysis receives additional justification (though we can hardly congratulate ourselves upon this matter) precisely from the attacks made upon the new method. Its opponents, renouncing all attempts at serious scientific criticism, would fain suppress it as anti-moral. A sexual ethic that stands above and outside the system of repressions is still almost incomprehensible to the public mind.

But the reader must not suppose that sexual repression stands as a sort of isolated rock in the sea of critical thought. This would not be true even if we were to contemplate only the state of affairs before 1914 (a limitation which would, unfortunately, be quite without warrant). There can be no question that sexual morality is closely connected with the social order, even though the former may not depend upon the latter quite so

¹ Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre, I, 1911, p. 212.

absolutely as certain simple-minded revolutionists imagine. This system of ideas has secured notable support from the observation of Ernest Jones, that in the middle ages sexual repression was based upon compensatory delusions, but at a later date was based upon hypocritical puritanism.¹ The author cannot mean to imply that any absolute increase of repression occurred during the later period, for there can be no question that the manifestations of sexuality became freer subsequent to the middle ages. The so-called "old liberalism" in like manner displays a freer spirit than clericalism, but is none the less characterised by an ostrich policy towards the discussion of certain problems, and, above all, of religious problems. I cannot follow up this thought, and my only reason for referring to the matter has been to show that evolution never makes equal progress in all fields, and that the study of isolated topics is indispensable.

Let us now turn to the social aims of psychoanalysis. We know that the essential object of analytic therapy is to lift to the level of self-critical judgment the patients who have remained fixed in the stage of repression. Corresponding therewith in the

¹ Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

social field we have the acceleration of evolution à la Durkheim towards social solidarity. This acceleration does not involve any blind affirmation of a dogmatically conceived process, like that contemplated by Marxist socialism, but leaves room for courageous and purposive effort to counteract enduring trends. Moreover, every detail, the most important details not excepted, is the concern of politics, and has nothing to do with psychoanalysis. For psychoanalysis can hardly have a message to convey upon land reform or the other proposals of any political party. Only the fundamental aim of evolution, the spirit, the atmosphere, can serve as a link between psychoanalysis and politics. But as far as this fundamental aim is concerned, it is positively essential that they should join hands. In addition, there are of course, many concrete points of contact.

Analytical treatment aims at influencing the patient so that he may on the one hand recognise every possibility, antisocial possibilities not excepted, and may on the other hand comprehend what is socially necessary. A purely static and intellectualist disclosure of the pathogenic material is just as futile as are superficial persuasion and sermonising. In psychoanalysis, conviction means that the

patient must convince himself. No one can give salvation to another. We can only place in another's hands the means wherewith he can work out his own salvation. Psychoanalysis wishes to train human beings who shall be free and individually different, but who shall unremittingly advance towards co-operation; human beings united by organic solidarity. To the economic basis of this society, to the division of labour upon which Durkheim lays so much stress, psychoanalysis adds the pertinent psychological foundation—critical thought that is free both outwardly and inwardly. The other favourite idea of Durkheim, that of contractual solidarity, is the idea of unification, of conviction. It is obvious that analytical treatment, within its limits, contributes towards this end, for the psychoneuroses are likewise social phenomena. Furthermore, psychoanalysis springs in addition from regions quite distinct from pathology. The literature of the subject, and especially the analytical books written by non-medical authors, afford proof of the wide radiations of the work. The analytical psychology of religion has a spirit perfectly identical with that of Durkheim; using other weapons, it reinforces the same novel trend of freethought. In place of the contemptuous

neglect of religion and in place of tasteless mockery of religion (both of these are manifestations of repression), we have explanations of the function of religion. The acquisitions of psychoanalysis in the field of sexual morality, those which support the demand for deliberate regulation and sublimation, will help to free us once for all from the hopeless alternatives of hypocrisy or libertinism. Now this advance cannot fail to react upon the whole system of social organisation.

In the educational field, the aim of psychoanalysis is to put an end to the present condition of affairs, wherein the upbringing of the child takes the form of establishing inhibitions of which the young man has to rid himself with great difficulty in order that he may enter into the comparatively free life of society, inhibitions that interpose obstacles against the further emancipation of this society. Psychoanalysts wish to awaken parents to a sense of responsibility, to make parents realise how immoral it is to give vent to their own impulses in their relations to their children, to induce elders utterly to abandon the policy of "ask no questions." † The aim of psychoanalysis is to put an end to the

† K. Abraham, Ueber Schaulust, etc., Jahrbuch, VI, p. 73.

fixation of birth, the archetype of human weakness, to put an end to dependence and irresponsibility. Psychoanalysts desire to free the individual and society from the yoke of the species.

I believe that I am correct in thus interpreting the clear indication of Ferenczi that psychoanalysis desires an individualist-socialist society.¹ This would not be a mingling of unbridled anarchism and despotic communism, but the very opposite. It would be a union of libertarian individualism and regulative collectivism, of self-government and control. It would be the community of the division of labour; of the highest possible economic and spiritual development; of concord, justice, and individuality.

We must reject all combinations of terror and anarchy. Utterly false would it be to maintain that psychoanalysis, which is indeed revolutionary, approves every possible revolution for its own sake. Psychoanalysts are aware that the rebellion against paternal authority which is the root of social reform,² invariably contains elements of justice and rationality; they are aware that it can never be superfluous:

¹ *Nervöse Symptome, etc.*, p. 24.

² Cf. Rank, *op. cit.*, p. 391.

And even though the world, resolving other conflicts, should
 grow beautiful,
 There will persist the conflict between fathers and sons.¹

But to psychoanalysis, the creator of "self-critical judgment," this revolt cannot be an end in itself. Psychoanalysts do not offer up moral aims as a sacrifice to a mere desire for change; the revolution they hope for is not an overthrow but an ascent. Equally foreign, therefore, to the spirit of psychoanalysis are red ruin and black reaction. No less remote from that spirit, likewise, is of course formal bourgeois democracy. The place of psychoanalysis in the struggle of the great powers is by the side of "liberal socialism."

In these matters weighty issues hang upon the future course of our movement. The usual standpoint is that psychoanalytically trained experts are to realise the fruitful possibilities of the new system of thought; but it may well happen that the leadership will for a long time remain in the hands of the "professional" leaders. I may have further occasion to refer to corrections, new applications, and ethical relationships. This much, at least, I can confidently assert at the present stage of the enquiry. Without being false to its psychological centre, to its

¹ F. Werfel, *op. cit.*

essential etymological significance, to its primal source of energy, psychoanalysis, that powerful international spiritual movement, may boldly undertake the realisation of its social aims. For, in the end comes action.

PART TWO

**SOCIOLOGICAL TASKS OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS**

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

IN Part One, Sociological Results of Psychoanalysis, I formulated a distinction between results which had been achieved by the direct observation of society and those which had been achieved by the psychological and psychiatric study of individuals. The results belonging to the former class were again divided into two groups: the first of these comprised items of knowledge concerning more or less primitive collective ideas (especially myths); the second comprised items of knowledge concerning primitive social structure. I expressed the opinion that, although the last-named branch of study is the typically sociological field of investigation, the most important sociological results had been secured by means of psychoanalysis proper. We now have to throw light on the possibilities which lie open to psychoanalysis upon the sociological field, and to outline researches deliberately aiming in this direction. In addition, and

above all, we shall attempt to give an example of the realisation of one of these possibilities.

The conscious sociological orientation of psychoanalysis would appropriately belong to a higher stage of organisation in general. Hitherto, psychoanalysis has achieved the observation of social phenomena in the following way. The psychoanalyst, having again and again discovered in his patients symbolical expressions of typical contents of the unconscious, has then noted in mass psychology the presence of constructions of ostensibly similar form. In the case of primitive societies, also, attention was directed to these likenesses. The sociological trends of psychoanalysis in the narrower sense of the term, were present only in the germ. For psychoanalysis was in general concerned rather with the typical contents and their forms of expression, than with their various structural configurations, with characterology, with differential psychology. By such methods it was impossible to produce even a moderately systematic picture.

If, however, we subject to a more intensive statistical elaboration and systematisation the materials hitherto furnished by psychoanalysis, it would seem already certain, in view of what psychoanalysis has taught concerning the role of society in the develop-

ment of the individual, that interesting sociological results would be secured.

Above all it would be important to note the social environment of the patients under treatment. We are familiar with the factors which contribute to the causing of a psychoneurosis. Repression is a preeminently social process. The pecuniary circumstances of the patient, the class to which he belongs, his occupation, the intellectual and social level of the environment of his childhood's days, i.e. of his family, are by no means indifferent. Freud¹ discusses the comparative destinies of girls belonging respectively to a propertyless and to a well-to-do family. The former is able to secure freer satisfaction of the impulsive life, whereas the latter, unequal to the demands of repression, becomes a neurotic being (of course this is but one of many possible contrasts, but it is a frequent form). Medical practitioners have long been aware that neuroses are especially common among well-to-do families, whereas psychoses predominate among the poorer classes of the population. Unquestionably a part cause of this lies in the physical conditions, which contribute especially to engender psychoses, for these disorders find

¹ Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, Allgemeine Neurosenlehre, Vienna, 1907, p. 407.

a more favourable soil in material want. There must, however, also be psychological determinants. Psychoanalysis teaches that the two psychoses which are most accessible to analytic study, paranoia and paraphrenia, differ in their mechanism from the psychoneuroses, especially in this, that in the two former the disorders of the ego predominate—in association with narcissistic fixation. Now uncertainty as to the position of the ego begins very early in the families of the poor.

In our consideration of social relationships, however, we have to take many things into account besides financial position. First of all, financial position and class status do not necessarily coincide. Entirely different ideologies and mental constellations prevail in an impoverished patrician family, on the one hand, and in a family of working-class origin that has risen to a competence, on the other; like differences are seen as between a middle-class family and an aristocratic family enjoying the same income. The available means do not in themselves produce either stability or recklessness; they do not produce either steadfast clinging to tradition or love for innovation; nor do they account for the varying family environment of the child. We have to remember that occupation exercises

an influence in other spheres than those in which class is at work ; that class exercises its influence in other spheres than those in which material position is at work ; and so on. Religious and other traditions, and various special qualities, must be considered. Only a detailed study of the facts can throw light on these questions.

The objection might be raised that this would involve a return from psychoanalysis to a purely descriptive and superficial psychiatric method ; that it would imply a renunciation of the endeavour to trace out the mechanism of the disease, and would lead us to look once more for purely external " causes." There is no foundation for any such criticism. Psychoanalysis has already displayed lively interest in the family position of the patient, and has paid peculiar attention to the qualities of the father. Closely considered, this might be held not to belong to the analysis of the psyche, but might be regarded as a necessary utilisation of the data acquired by psychoanalysis. In a word, it is the systematic juxtaposition of psychoanalytical data with other facts not acquired by analysis. It would not so much mean that the analyst would deduce a psychical disorder from the social circumstances of the parents, as that he would connect its genesis

with the special circumstances of their married life. Of this much I am certain, that if the huge mass of available material were subjected to some such more intensive comparison and differentiation, the further analytical increase of the material would be facilitated, for the process would render possible the fixation of details which have so far been left out of the reckoning. What we have in view, therefore, is not to replace psychoanalysis, but to render it more profound. There can be no doubt that the material and the symbolism of the unconscious exhibit remarkable similarity in different individuals. Every analyst has noted the deviations, the varying texture, of the material and its phenomenal forms. An understanding of these things would be notably enhanced if a light were thrown upon their relationships to the situation of the individual.

But why, when we speak of this situation, do we lay so much stress upon social position? For this reason, because in the psychical sphere the social position of the patient gives occasion for the deduction of general laws. I do not think that any psychiatrist can fail to devote conscientious attention to the patient's bodily state. Psychoanalysts, too, if we except those of Adler's school with their

doctrine of the "inferiority of organs," pay attention to the secondary psychosexual functions of the various organs essential to the maintenance of life. A more precise and detailed study of these interrelations between soma and psyche must be the task of biology, or of the biological doctrine of the impulsive life, wherein analysis will obviously have to play a leading part. Upon the other side of mental development we find the influence of the family entourage and of additional elements in the environment. These additional elements, comprise in part those of a chance character, which, owing to their immediacy, come to the surface abundantly in every analysis. But the more permanent elements of the environment are those social characteristics we have just been discussing. They less readily press to the front of the stage in the course of the analysis, but any far-reaching development of analytical science must take them adequately into account. Such a more differential and more systematic psychology would not be a metaphysical or dialectical degeneration of psychoanalysis. It would merely imply the fuller organisation and promotion of the science, would necessitate a more thrifty utilisation of the raw material, and would presuppose a more fruitful collection

of data. Analysis would remain the empirical centre of the method, but would acquire greater significance. A number of socio-psychological questions, to the answering of which analysis has as yet contributed no more than indirectly by its search for analogies to typical mental constructions, would now become more directly accessible to actual analysis.

In the first section, the idea was more than once outlined that a link between two branches of research would prove of almost equal use to both. We need not consider the advantages that might accrue to psychoanalysis from such a supplementary study; what concerns us here is the profit to sociology. It is essential to this science that those who study it should be acquainted with the influences which society and its subdepartments exercise upon the individual mind. They must be in a position to observe the unconscious stirrings of the masses, not only in their results, but likewise in their course, and indeed in the nascent state. When the sociologist has at his disposal data concerning the manifest and empirically discovered psychological correlates of the various social happenings, he will be able to form far sounder judgments of social dynamics, social possibilities, and social aims.

This of course does not imply that sociological research will become superfluous, any more than that psychoanalytical study will become superfluous. Such a development would be a retrogression of science, whereas the proposed integration would be an advance.

Ferenczi holds [oral report] that, as part of a neurotic syndrome, there may be a stirring of sexual desire towards members of a different social class from the patient's. The psychological study of this phenomenon will presumably help to explain why even persons inspired by thoroughly democratic sentiments and uninfluenced by material considerations, will venerate the nobility; and what part so irrational an attitude may play in social transformations, in revolutionary outbreaks, etc. This branch of psychoanalytical study will not, of course, serve to explain why such transformations and outbreaks occur; but it should certainly serve to throw light upon the mechanism of these processes, upon the forms under which they usually manifest themselves, upon changes in ideology, upon inhibitions, etc. Another interesting statement of Ferenczi's refers to the attitude of impecunious patients towards the doctor. He considers that there are two distinct types of patient. Those belonging to one of these types

feel a reverence for the doctor as the representative of a higher class and a person endowed with great power. Those of the other type are defiant and stubborn, feeling towards the doctor the mistrust and hatred which they feel for everyone belonging to the master class. We are immediately reminded that a similar duality of outlook prevails towards the clergy among the broad masses of the people. A study of the transference of affect to the physician, especially as it occurs among poor and uncultured patients, may help us to an understanding of clericalism and anticlericalism among the folk. On the other hand, to keep to the same example, we may expect to find characteristic varieties. Suspicion of the man whose function it is to know things, and suspicion of the man who is in God's confidence, are not identical. We must not uncritically transfer to the latter, observations that have been made regarding the former; and conversely.

An important element in social relationships is constituted by the mental characteristics of the various nationalities, races, and culture-groups. The expansion of psychoanalytical study would help us to learn in what nations particular impulsive trends are dominant, which symbols are most widely diffused, which

constructions and which manifestations are proper to the individual nations. We are practically justified in assuming that such characteristics exist. It seems most improbable that the groups of qualities which indubitably stamp particular nations—which produce a national aroma so to speak—are mere mixtures of such general traits as civilisation and barbarism, tenacity and fickleness, trustworthiness and untrustworthiness. These cannot suffice to account for the matter. The problem of the origin of national qualities belongs chiefly to the spheres of geography, history, and sociology; but the inner mechanism of these qualities cannot be fully elucidated without analytical research.

We owe to Maeder an attempt at the systematic study of the English national character—not directly analytical, but guided by psychoanalytical ideas.¹ The author describes the two main types of English youth, the “puppy” and the “girl,” the dominant part played by women (“management”), the widespread sexual repression, the manifestations of anal-erotic character traits, the cult of pet animals, and hero-worship. Noteworthy is his concluding observation that the English character

¹ *Psychoanalytische Eindrücke von einer Reise in England*, Imago, 1912.

is far from producing a general impression of being neurotic; the prevailing repression seems to be effected almost without disturbance, to be successful. It would be interesting to carry Maeder's study further, in part by the use of the psychoanalytical material accumulated by British investigators, and in part by a consideration of the light which the thus-ascertained character traits throw upon other British qualities and upon the course of British policy. The peculiar hypocrisy of the British (not wholly antipathetic), the hypocrisy which is so manifest in British foreign policy, becomes unquestionably more comprehensible to one who is acquainted with the manifestations of British prudery. The partial intensification of repression, and on the other hand the almost complete disappearance of the subjection of women, are doubtless connected with the peculiar cleavage between English traditionalism and English rationalism. There may also be some connexion between this successful repression and the continued success of Britain in its relations with the foreign world. There is a point of contact between navalism and sexual symbolism; the "ship" is of the feminine gender.

Passing to consider other group characteristics, we may recall that Freud makes a

passing reference to the comparative freedom of the Viennese population in sexual matters.¹ This is of course related to the well-known "easy-going" characteristics of the Viennese. It would be impossible in the present sketch to suggest where the determining causes may lie. Let me next allude to the Prussian junkerdom, a phenomenon often described, which unquestionably derives in part from nonrational erotic impulses. One of its defenders, Scheler,² frankly declares that western armies and their ideology signify militarism for a purpose, whereas German armies signify temperamental militarism. This would imply that the German army was not so much the technical instrument for achieving the purposes of war, as the embodiment of a self-sufficing hedonistic impulse. Now we are aware that such an impulse can be analysed.

The more systematic study of national traits by psychoanalytical methods will not become possible until psychoanalysis has secured wider recognition and has been more generally practised. It is essential that country-dwellers should be analysed as well as town-

¹ Zur Geschichte der psychoanalytischen Bewegung, Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre, IV, Vienna, 1918, p. 42.—The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement, New York, 1917, p. 31.

² Die Ursachen des Deutschenhasses, Leipzig, 1917.

dwellers. It seems probable that folklorist studies may contribute to our knowledge in this respect.

Finally, psychoanalysis can assist in certain social constructions, can render valuable aid to various trends and movements. The main topic of this volume, however, is the indirect application of psychoanalysis to social movements. The task is certainly more difficult than the analytical study of mythology, for in the former branch of investigation the elements conflicting with the reality principle¹ that are elucidated by psychoanalysis give greater scope for economic and rationalist deductions—and the complications are so great that their unravelling becomes very difficult. How difficult, for example, would it be, in studying the origin of capitalism, to elucidate the part played by some immanent disorganisation in the middle ages, the part played by anal-erotic character traits, and the connexion between the two. I consider that the combined work of many investigators will be requisite for such studies. But I may lay down the following general principles.

Psychoanalysis is best fitted to undertake the study of those constructions in which the elements conflicting with the reality principle

¹ Lorenz, *Der politische Mythos, Imago*, 1920.

are most numerous.¹ The science can do more to explain mass impulses than to explain the phases of industrial development. Psychoanalysis is especially at home in the domain of the regressions. Adaptation to reality must apriori play a more notable part in anagogic movements. But since all such movements must possess a regressive libido-capital, they cannot be excluded from the domain of psychoanalysis, any more than sublimation in general can be excluded; the regressive element remains of permanent importance. Our study, however, must not put forward the claim that the construction under consideration is to be simply referred to an individuo-psychological schema; this would obviously be an attempt at an unduly crude simplification. On the other hand, care must be taken to avoid wandering off into the logic and dialectics of the question or into the critique of conflicting outlooks, and against entering too far into the investigation of the basic social reality, for all these things lie beyond the field of study. The aim is merely to rediscover in the social constructions the unconscious tendencies and their modes of expression that have been made manifest in the individual

¹ Cf. Rank and Sachs, *Die Bedeutung der Psychoanalyse für die Geisteswissenschaften*, Wiesbaden, 1913.

psyche—to rediscover them in whatever form they may manifest themselves. If we should succeed in this without any falsification of the data, the results will be applicable in various directions. Our general understanding of sociology will be facilitated ; gaps will be filled in ; hints will be furnished as to how libidomasses which are working along dangerous paths can be rendered harmless or can be diverted to useful routes. Perhaps, too, further light will be thrown upon the individual psyche, it may be in relation to the reciprocal influences between the elements conflicting with the reality principle, and reality itself.

As topic for my first venture, I choose Anarchist Communism, especially as a movement whose assumed cohesion may have more light thrown on it in the sequel. Why I do this, why I am convinced that this tendency-complex is of an entirely regressive character, will not perhaps be fully intelligible at the outset. I may, however, point out here that it is equipped with a vigorous and direct hedonistic theory, that it looks towards an earthly paradise as its goal, and that it aims at the complete destruction of the extant form of society. Wherever it wins to control, it brings about extreme disorganisation and a relapse to more primitive forms. I think,

therefore, that psychoanalysis promises interesting results in this field. Moreover, the topical importance of the problem, and the widespread general knowledge of certain forms of communism, render it desirable that psychoanalysts should turn their attention to this social complex.

CHAPTER TWO

ATTEMPT AT THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF ANARCHIST COMMUNISM

Anarchism leads to communism and communism to anarchism.

P. KROPOTKIN.

The communist state which would be brought into existence by the proletarian revolution, would be nothing else than a titanic system of landed proprietorship, embracing all the land in the country.

A. DANIEL, 1910.

A state which should undertake the comprehensive care of all members of the population on equal terms . . . would be the most complete renewal of the matriarchal type of community of primitive days.

E. LORENZ.

I

DEFINITIONS

BEFORE we attempt the psychoanalysis of anarchist communism, we must explain what we understand by the term, and must forestall a number of possible misunderstandings.

Many believe that anarchism, as extreme individualism, and communism, as extreme socialism, are polar opposites. Some assume that these poles come in contact, in virtue of the principle that extremes meet. This view is erroneous. It would be superfluous to expound here the problems of individualism and socialism. Enough to refer to the trends of anarchism and communism as ordinarily understood and as enunciated by their most distinguished advocates. Anarchism demands the abolition, not only of dominion, despotism, authority forcibly exercised over the individual, but in general of laws, regulations, and restrictions. Communism does not imply the maximum of social cooperation, but the direct psychical fusion of individuals in a manner that would annihilate all partitions between them. Why, then, does one aim involve the other? Anarchism wishes to abolish rules and restrictions. Should this be effected, there would necessarily ensue a war of all against all, the absolute dissolution of the community. But this is not the aim of the anarchists. Such dissolution would be avoidable on one condition, namely, if human selfishness were so infinitesimal and self-sacrifice and solidarity were so intense, that without any law human beings would voluntarily seek one another's

good. But this can only ensue through an actual welding together, through communism. Now let us turn to the basic principle of communism: From every man according to his powers, to every man according to his needs. Apart from momentary exercises of will, man does not work to the limit of his powers even under the most extreme coercion, but only does so in a spirit of voluntary sacrifice. On the other hand, no compulsion is requisite to make man satisfy his needs. Such a system is only conceivable if the needs of every man were such that their full satisfaction would not interfere with the equally full satisfaction of the needs of others. Consequently the anarchistic and communistic ideals are permanently coterminous. It is pure anarchism that men should unreservedly make others' interests their own when all external direction has been abolished; the unrestricted fusion of individualities is pure communism.

It is true that there is also an individualist anarchism, which takes self-interest as its basis. But even the anarchists of this school are constrained to recognise that progress along these lines will only be possible if human beings respect one another's claims on prudential grounds, if they impose restrictions upon themselves for well-considered reasons of their

own advantage. This, however, implies the transcending of anarchism. It is what Franz Oppenheimer has termed "acratia"; it is individualism; or perhaps we might better term it "personalism," since it implies that the community consists of self-controlling individuals, of personalities. Now the most elementary degree of sociological insight should suffice to convince the student that the way to this highly differentiated state of affairs is not to be found through the complete destruction of extant society.

There likewise exists a despotic form of communism, in which goods are distributed, not according to needs, but with mechanical equality. On the one hand, this communism is dogmatic, levelling, and fusionist; it closely resembles mechanical solidarity. On the other hand, equal distribution involves a transition towards justice, towards collectivism, whose essential principle is distribution in accordance with the work done by the recipient. Collectivism of this character, with socialised production, is, as Kropotkin aptly remarks, a logical contradiction.¹ It is quite impossible for any council to determine the value of labour;

¹ P. Kropotkin, *The Conquest of Bread*, Chapman and Hall, London, 1906. Chapter XIII, *The Collectivist Wages System*.

this can only be decided by free exchange, in the absence of monopoly. But a community in which there prevailed free competition and a purely working property, would be a society of personal collectivism, of organic solidarity, and would be the very opposite of anarchist communism. With such a society, therefore, we are not concerned. If we allude to it at all, it will only be by way of illustration.

Let me enumerate some of the traits which are common to anarchism and to communism, which distinguish both from personal collectivism, and from the intermediate systems. Both reject private property, the differentiation of economic life as the division of labour guaranteeing surplus production, and the differentiation or the very existence of the functions of the state. There is a yet closer uniformity exhibited by the two movements. Whatever differences they may manifest after they have been established, both systems look for the salvation of the world to a revolt of the oppressed which shall sweep away all that has hitherto existed. There is no individualist anarchist movement of any dimensions worth considering. The communism of the social democrats has a definitely collectivist trend, without, however, abandoning its ultimate aim. We must not under-

estimate the importance of the individualistic trends in social democracy, the trends that are statist, democratic, and realist. Nevertheless, this does not imply that we cannot find among the social democrats the chief elements of the communist and proletarian position, at any rate now, when in consequence of the war a powerful communist trend has manifested itself. I do not posit the existence of an anarchist communist movement entirely free from contradictions; I merely presume a certain fundamental unity, which is crystallisable in a unified type of social organisation (cf. § IX).

It is, moreover, needless to explain that, for the purposes of this investigation, anarchist communist literature—even when considered in outline—is just as incomprehensible as are the other manifestations of the movement. I have done my best to take into account its most typical and important elements. Let me repeat that my aim is not to criticise anarchist communism, not even to write a most elementary sociology or psychology of the doctrine, but to provide as far as I am able a psychoanalytical interpretation. This, however, involves references to anarchist communist sociology, and even to its critical method. In the present state of our ter-

minology, morphological designations frequently carry with them implications of judgments of value (e.g. evolution, reversion). Were we to be too scrupulous in the avoidance of criticism, we should turn our backs on knowledge. Besides, it is impossible to avoid drawing certain distinctions, as between theory and practice, between programs and possibilities.

II

ANARCHIST SOCIOLOGY

The essence of anarchism is the detestation of all law, the revolt against law and any kind of outward coercion. Augustin Hamon, who is sympathetic to the anarchist movement, has studied its psychology upon the basis of materials obtained by the circulation of a questionnaire. In his book,¹ he maintains that the tendency to revolt comes first, "individualism" second. But this individualism is of a kind which does not recognise private property. In one of the answers we read: "Everything belongs to all; nothing belongs to anyone individually unless he is actually using it." There are also allusions

¹ *Psychologie de l'anarchiste-socialiste*, Paris, 1895.

to the family community as a social aim. Another reply condemns the cult of the ego. Another correspondent writes: "Physical needs are the same for everyone." Thus, as is plain from the quotations, the spirit of revolt does not signify the autonomy of the individual, but, as Hamon himself insists, absolute antitraditionalism and the cosmopolitanism which this carries with it. The entire lack of roots is disclosed in the fanaticism which would throw everything overboard; perhaps it is also shown by the measureless innovationism to which the book refers, the spirit which confidently regards all the extant as fit for the scrap-heap, and demands a clean sweep. Evidence of this spirit is afforded by religious indifference, by the abandonment of everything which links us to the existing world, by fanatical adhesion to the anarchist ideal. Let us take examples from various authors. Among the Greeks, Zeno was an anarchist, an opponent of private property; Carpocrates was a communist anarchist. In the middle ages, Amalrich of Bona advocated a communist form of anarchism, preaching the mystical direct union of the individual soul with God. P. Chelcicky emphasised the abandonment of law, as did subsequently J. P. Proudhon and Johann Most.

Improvised decisions were to take the place of laws. Alexander Herzen wrote: "Long live chaos and destruction. Make way for the future. We are the executioners of the past." Mihail Bakunin declared: "The best constitution in the world would not satisfy me"; he considered the only good life would be without either law or majority principle. It is obvious that if the majority can in no circumstances impose constraint on the minority, the only way of avoiding complete atomisation will be that all men shall share the same view, shall automatically move in a single direction. Bearing this in mind, let us proceed with our study of anarchist revolutionism, which actually involves the repudiation of every statist and democratic majority principle.

We know that the prototype of all revolt is rebellion against the father. The reader of the first section may recall the psychological identity which was established between the father and society. From this outlook, anarchism might be regarded as an extreme form of revolt against the father; the revolt of those who are not content to accept paternal authority in a modified, sublimated, non-despotic, democratic form, a form which involves no oppression, but supplies rational

inhibition or guidance ; the revolt of those who wish to destroy all such coercion in the germ.

It is, however, undeniable that at least the communist wing of the anarchists, by far the most numerous, does not aim at the abolition of all external influence. If, indeed, the influence of the community is so powerful that the individual accepts it blindly, if, that is to say, the consciousness does not feel any coercion, we may speak of the total abandonment of individual autonomy. We have prototypes of this condition : in the foetus ; to a lesser extent in the infant ; and to a still lesser extent in the child. The radical destruction of paternal coercion would thus be a return to the painless and pleasurable maternal coercion ; the correlate of the slaying of the father is incest with the mother. It now becomes easy for us to understand why individualist anarchism has comparatively little significance, and why it cannot supply the ideology of a movement. It does not attach to parricide the idea of incest with the mother, but the idea of emancipation. Now this does not suffice to satisfy the great aim of regression, and it is therefore doomed to remain an isolated phenomenon.

From this the cult of the *tabula rasa* is entirely deducible. Those trends which aim at

abolishing dominion, at acratia or pure democracy, at the complete reduction of coercion to law and regulation, naturally desire to maintain and further the previous evolution, in so far as it was really evolution; they are content with a reform, however radical, of the extant. But the anarchists, desiring the complete abolition of paternal coercion, move in an opposite direction, move regressively towards the killing of the father. They desire neither an intermediate stage nor an evolution, but simply the renewal of the titanic deed. It is owing to this intransigence that communist anarchism is less widely diffused than communism in the narrower sense. The matter will become clearer when we study communist regression.

The passionate and impulsive revolt of the anarchists against all restrictions, does not, of course, entail the freedom proper to the adult, but only the unrestrictedness of the child, or, to speak more precisely, of the foetus. It corresponds to a condition wherein there is no need for adaptation, or for conflict of any sort. Rousseau's "return to nature" is purely anarchistic; we know that nature is the symbol of the mother.¹ Hatred of theistic

¹ Cf. H. Sachs, Ueber Naturgefühl, *Imago*, 1912.—E. Hitschmann, Ein Dichter und sein Vater, *Imago*, IV, 1915-16, p. 337.

religions does not imply the lack of all religious sentiment, of pantheistic sentiment, for instance. Far from it; fanaticism, abandonment of individual aims, complete loss of interest in the other elements of life, are religious and antirational. Hamon lays stress on the proselytising tendencies of anarchism. All that the anarchist is alien to is the religiosity and the antirationalism of extant historical traditions; he desires, so to speak, to regress into the intra-uterine existence with its pseudo-rationalistic religiosity, and to destroy everything which stands in his way. The anarchistic ideal is, beyond question, also the abolition of repression. But repression is not to be replaced by self-critical judgment; it is to be replaced by libertinism. And yet (this is the essential matter, and almost the only one which bears any relationship to reality), in theory at least, and for the time being, the impulses of man are to be of such a character that their indulgence will not render social life impossible. Herein, however, lies the essential conflict with the reality principle, and therefore the essential impracticability of anarchism. In psychoanalytical terminology, we can explain as follows why social progress is possible and why anarchism is impossible. Social progress is possible because

it aims, not at repression, but at self-critical judgment; the possibility of this substitution has been proved. Anarchism, on the other hand, aims at unrestricted self-indulgence, and therewith at a complete transformation of the impulses. But all our experience leads us to deny that this is possible. Anarchism is the faithful social projection of the uterus, with repudiation of the manifest uterus wish; this construction, in the simplicity of its relationships, bears witness to the utter absurdity of the doctrine. The system does not seem to be sufficiently developed to bear comparison with more complex psychical constructions, such as the psychoneuroses. It offers, however, interesting material for study.

III

PSYCHICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ANARCHISM

There is one trait of anarchism with which the psychoanalyst has long been familiar. The anarchist doctrine proclaims complete solidarity, declares rules restricting the individual to be superfluous, announces universal brotherhood. On the other hand, in the public mind, the concept of anarchism is for excellent

reasons associated with that of a thirst for blood, of bomb throwing, of the desolation of "art for art's sake." It is but a step from Reclus the vegetarian, who conceived of the whole world as united in a single family, to Nechayeff and propaganda by deed. Bakunin's phrase, "brotherhood by force," gives an excellent picture of this cleavage. Obviously we here encounter a variety of ambivalence, something which is not rational but affective. Could not psychoanalysis throw light upon this application of the technical term? The primary instance of ambivalence, we might say the leading instance, derives from that society of brethren who, in the primitive horde, had united to slay the father.¹ The ambivalence did not, properly speaking, relate to the father. Towards him there was felt, in the instance under consideration, an inward, unrestricted hatred; and his ambivalent affective value did not make itself felt until later, when the time for the restoration of the father came. The ambivalence applied in the first instance to the community of the brethren, a community to which in the primitive consciousness no sociological significance attached. This community had two concrete points of

¹ Cf., in addition to Freud's Totem und Tabu, B. von Felszeghy, Panik und Pan-Komplex, Imago, 1920.

condensation: the first of these was the mother, from whom the brethren were derived, and to whom (or, to express it more boldly, into whom) they all wished to return—the libido concerned her; the other was the father, who kept the sons away from their goal and held sway over them—the hatred concerned him. Anarchism is a regression to this attitude of mind. Its ideal is brotherhood in the primitive sense of the word, the confraternal uterine introversion. The anarchist rages irreconcilably against everything that represents a hindrance to the satisfaction of this desire, against the dominion of the father and all that it signifies. The eroticism which had developed among the brethren was merely the precipitation of the ungratified incest wish, with the maintenance of the incest principle. This explains the simultaneous enthusiasm for community, and hostility towards society, manifested by the anarchists. Neither of these sentiments really bears upon the abstract concept of society. The former concerns the mother and the return to the mother; the latter concerns the father and the social cooperation which takes place under his sign. The comparatively scientific formulas of anarchist writers have at their base this primevally ancient affective content, which

can serve as the foundation of theories ; but the content itself, remote from all theories, signifies the regressive wish of the clan of brethren.

In this way, perhaps, we can gain a glimpse into the depths of anarchist projection and absurdity. According to the psychoanalytic hypotheses, after the parricide the brethren did not attain their goal, and were unable to get along without the father. The principal cause of this turn of affairs may have been the actual impossibility of the incest gratification. In the course of evolution this led to various methods of compensation. The mother was replaced by other women (by sisters at first, and subsequently by having recourse to exogamy). Another resource was the invention and utilisation of the earth symbol. Another was identification with the father. At first this was taken literally, by the adoption of the father's relationship towards the mother. Later, sublimation having occurred, the identification took rather the form of adopting the relationship expressed in that of the prince to the country.¹ Last of all came modern democracy. Anarchism rejects these institutions which provide satisfaction by devious routes and in ways whereby

¹ Lorenz, *op. cit.*

the primeval condition is completely transformed. The anarchists detest legal marriage, popular traditions, international organisation, and democracy. Nevertheless, as we have pointed out, anarchists must keep in touch with reality in one respect ; they must recognise the actual state of affairs as an extant reality, even if it is to be completely destroyed. From this results the automatic social projection of the primitive wish, the transformation of the paternal and suprapaternal community to become an infrapaternal community. We do not know to what extent the success of the anarchist principle would bring about a retrogression to the primitive horde. As far as communism is concerned, we shall see that such a tendency is at work ; we shall see that the pansocial idea of humanity has no real content, being merely a projection adjusted to the contemporary state of affairs. As the ultimate absurdity of anarchist doctrine, however, we encounter the primal absurdity, to wit, the impossibility of the actual union within the mother. Social projection is the maintenance of social cohesion in conjunction with the abolition of all regulation. Just as the slaying of the father necessarily resulted in the isolation of the mother (Penelope could not give her hand to any of the suitors), so

the abolition of the stable organisation would necessarily involve the destruction of society.¹

Let us consider a few additional characteristics of anarchism, characteristics which distinguish it from communism, or to speak more precisely, from the purely Marxist proletarian ideology. Hamon lays stress upon the anarchist's desire for a logical social order. This signifies a desire for simplicity and comprehensibility without traditions or complications. The logic is a logic of passion, a physicist logic "which tolerates no contradictions." The corresponding attitude of mind is not that of the political radicalism which, refusing to subject itself to the inertia of tradition, desires to reorganise society in accordance with the results of sociological research and rational conviction. Nor is it the attitude of the rigidly dogmatic and pseudorationalist Marxist system, although this is closely akin. Anarchism is not criticism, but cynicism; it is not reform, but a *tabula rasa*. Looking upon it as a social conception, what corresponds to it in the general sphere is nihilism, the philosophy of the return to nullity, chaos. The libidinous symbolical significance of death

¹ On the other hand, the further sublimation of the father motif (and, parallel thereto, of the mother motif) is a possible and real conception.

is comprised herein. Anarchism is logical in so far as it recognises that the social order is not only logical, but is likewise unrational and extralogical. The anarchist, however, does not strive after the elimination of the unrational; he does not attempt to make a logical use of the extralogical materials; he aims at the void of immaterial logic as symbol of libido regression.

The esoteric character of anarchism vividly recalls the clan of the brethren and the secret societies of savages. An invariable characteristic of anarchism, as compared with communism, is that anarchistic action is more individual and more in conflict with the criminal law. Bomb throwing is an entirely mystical, individual, unsophisticated copy of parricide. It is impossible to ascertain by what means the clan of the brethren may have carried out the act of parricide. It is, however, a fact that in the preparation of bombs by the anarchistic associations, the anarchist technique and logic are most clearly illustrated—just as Marxist technique and logic are best illustrated by the dogmatism of the class war, and radical technique and logic by sociology.

We cannot here attempt a thorough discussion of the question in what epochs anarchism, in the narrower sense of the term,

flourishes, and what sort of individuals are marshalled in the ranks of the anarchist army. The anarchist movement is utterly devoid of the historicity and coordination which are proper to Marxism, for anarchism is too much in conflict with the reality principle and too individual to possess these qualities. In any case, the anarchists are personally speaking far more often pathological specimens than the communists are. Psychoanalysis of the former would consequently give more valuable results. Hamon admits that many moral and mental defectives join the anarchist movement. More important is the fact that anarchists for the most part are not typical proletarians. Many of them are petty bourgeois, but the anarchist ranks are recruited in especial from among those who work alone. Thus the anarchist trend would seem to be accentuated by the lack of social cooperation, probably in conjunction with arduous conditions of life.¹

¹ I do not mean to imply that the petty bourgeois class is anarchistically inclined. There is no such thing as an anarchistic class; and the petty bourgeois tends rather to be a conservative or a radical. To work alone entails nothing more than a good chance of complete regression. It cannot per se cause such regression. The so-called individualistic character of anarchism is connected with the asociality of foetal life. See below, where the case of the proletariat is considered.

IV

PSYCHICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNISM

Communism gives the preference to a motive which the anarchists regard merely as an indispensable condition, and one which can be fulfilled without any difficulty, namely, direct, mechanical solidarity rising superior to all individual interests. Unrestraint, the giving of free rein to impulse, which plays the chief part in anarchism, will for communists be a later development. Communism is, indeed, far more inclined to make concessions to the despotic principle than anarchism is inclined to make concessions to individualism. The communism of Plato recognised rules of life; it was aristocratic; it breathed the spirit of tutelage, the repudiation of individual autonomy. The communism of the early Christian associations was not essentially despotic, but was dominated by the aim to put a bridle upon desire; this bridle was supplied by the cult of poverty, though the poverty was doubtless to be compensated by happiness in the life beyond. Saint-Simon's doctrine was a purely despotic communism. Compare also the Inca state, and Paraguay

under Jesuit rule. The Marxist communism which is threatening contemporary civilisation, though anarchistic in its ultimate aims, is prepared to make a most extensive use of the coercive powers of the state, of militarism and of dogmatism. These methods, we are told, may have to be employed for years or even decades.

Nevertheless it would be an error to believe that communism is nothing more than neo-feudalism with a libertarian gloss. In *The State and Revolution*, Lenin adopts and amplifies the Marx-Engels theory of the state. Every state, he declares, is a mechanism for exploitation and oppression in the hands of the dominant class. The proletariat must use this instrument against its former tyrants. When by this means the system of exploitation and oppression has been completely shattered, the state will die out. What is the difference between this ideology and that of the anarchists? Merely that the anarchists are more intransigent, while the communists are more methodical. Anarchism will hear of no delay in the application of force, and will tolerate no pause in the evolution towards brotherhood; whereas communism endeavours to destroy existing society by seizing it in its own fortress.

Before I expound the difference psychoanalytically, let me point out that communism is not only more methodical than anarchism, but is also more scientific, more accordant with facts, less impulsive. Its social supporters are proletarians. These, owing to their productive functions, and in virtue of the concentration of their forces, are naturally less averse than the anarchists from the work of social cooperation; and their lives bring them into touch with reality, with industrial and economic technique. For this reason, the regressive element in communism is less extreme. There are, in fact, many indications that communists exhibit less hostility towards the father, or at least towards certain forms of the father imago. *Enfantin*, the leader of the Saint-Simonians, bore the title of Father. In Fourier's scheme it was expressly declared that there were to be rulers or unarchs; and the supreme ruler, who was to reside in Constantinople, would be known as the omniarch. The anxiety which many earnest communists (*Kropotkin*, for instance) feel, lest under the dictatorship of the proletariat the dictatorship should become an end in itself, suffices to prove that there is no diametrical opposition between the communist spirit and paternal authority. The communist formula, "from

everyone according to his powers, to everyone according to his needs," accepted in its literal sense, leads to anarchism. But from this interpretation there are two deviations. When we say that we expect from everyone work according to his powers, this may mean that work according to power is to be exacted by the state; it may mean enforced altruism. On the other hand, the satisfaction of needs can be understood in the sense that the state shall prescribe what those needs are to be. This is, indeed, the condition of affairs in the first phase of communist society, the so-called socialist phase. There, everyone is a state employee. Apart from a comparatively small number of authoritative persons, all will receive the same wage or the same assignments. Consumption will be mechanically levelled, in respect of quality no less than of quantity.

As long as communist society has failed to attain the stage of complete anarchism, it rests solely upon patriarchal foundations. Persons are subject to an authority which by hypothesis is benevolent, but which is absolute. Everyone is aware that the dictatorship of the proletariat by no means signifies the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie; but the dictatorship of the proletarian principle, incorporated in the leaders,

over all members of the community and in especial over the proletarians themselves. It further signifies the deliberate proletarianisation of society. Private property and an economy based upon exchange, which guarantee individual independence and autonomy, are to perish; all persons are to become children of the state. For the time being, the state will have a well-defined paternal character. From this transitional form, the purely communistic "state" that is to follow will be distinguished (we can confidently predict) by its predominantly maternal character.

Thus we maintain that communism signifies a compromise between the father principle and the mother principle; but the assertion requires to be stated with greater precision. That with which we have to do is not a middle course between regression and evolution, but simply a mitigation of regression accompanied by a greater regard for reality. We have to do with a compromise, which can hardly be anything more than a compromise. Communism bears the same sort of relationship to anarchism as paranoia to paraphrenia (*dementia praecox*). The father principle is in this form likewise a regressive principle, associated of course with projection. According to Vandervelde, socialism is an "apparent"

return to primitive methods of production, in which the production of use values for the social community will take the place of the production of values for the family community.¹ I must here draw attention to one of the basic ideas of communism, namely that the undeveloped condition of social organisation will be combined with a measure of certain quanta among which we may include the comprehensiveness of the society, technical and cultural requisites, etc. But as a standard of human progress, it is not the quanta of products that are significant, even when these are forthcoming and are important; what counts is the degree of advancement of social organisation. In the first section I showed the parallelism which exists between Durkheim's mechanical solidarity and Freud's repression; and on the other hand the parallelism between organic solidarity and self-critical judgment. I contend that, not chronologically alone, but also in accordance with its essential nature, repression occupies a place between unrestricted self-indulgence and the reasoned condemnation of antisocial wishes. I consider that even in a society based upon mechanical solidarity, the sys-

¹ Vandervelde, *Collectivism and Industrial Evolution*, London, 1907, p. 163.

tematisation of outward coercion (militarism) represents an advance in the direction of organic solidarity. Thus the path of regression runs much after this fashion: sublimated social order; primitive father principle; primitive mother principle. Logically this path leads to anarchism, in so far as the regulatory functions of the state decay concomitantly with the regression. One cannot immediately explain the appearance of coercion, of tyranny, in the father stage. It would be erroneous to believe that the father is the first incorporation of coercion, of the restriction of individual autonomy. In the father, coercion becomes more fully conscious, it already approximates to masterless rule. But the first incorporation is in the mother: the womb is the prototype of all prisons, and the umbilical cord is the prototype of all chains. Whilst maternal coercion possesses a high libidinous value (mother hypnosis), this libido-tinting by no means disappears in paternal coercion, though it becomes paler. This is proved by a number of homosexual-masochistic fixations (father hypnosis).¹ Mother eroticism, was not only the erotic feeling of man towards

¹ Cf. Jung, Die Bedeutung des Vaters für das Schicksal des Einzelnen, Jahrbuch, I, 1909.—Concerning the hypnoses, cf. Ferenczi, Introjektion und Uebertragung, *ibid.*

woman ; it was in part a brother eroticism (a feeling of man towards man), and in part a father eroticism (cf. Lorenz). The communist movement, therefore, arises from a social regressive tendency in the direction of the mother by way of the primitive father, in conflict with the contemporary, greatly sublimated manifestation of the father imago. A characteristically communist attitude (which has as its ideology the "relative value of personal freedom") is the straightforwardly enthusiastic campaign against the feudalist-capitalist infringement of personal liberty ; which is followed, as soon as the communists attain power, by a sudden and affectively endorsed entire rejection of the concept of personal liberty.¹

The reasons why the proletarian movement has taken this course will only become comprehensible from the psychoanalytical standpoint when we have studied the position of the proletariat.

¹ In Budapest, after the proclamation of the Soviet Republic, I complained to a friend, who had always been a progressive and had recently become a communist, that the liberties gained by the revolution were now being thrown into the melting-pot, for criticism of the ordinances issued by the Soviet Government was strictly prohibited. He looked at me in astonishment, saying : " But what on earth do you find to complain of in the ordinances of the Soviet Government ? "

V

THE POSITION OF THE PROLETARIAT

The position of the proletariat might be briefly described by saying that in the proletariat there is no opportunity for a number of more or less sublimatory forms of libido displacement, and that in consequence there occurs a dangerous damming-up of libido. Now this does not take place as concerns the individual proletarian, but as concerns the proletarian class, for the reason that the class, the proletarian community, offers the only refuge both in respect of the utilisation of libido and in respect of the preservation of the ego. I speak of the typical proletarian, without ignoring that all this can be applied only with reserve to a considerable part of the proletariat. Consequently, even a typically proletarian communism has often taken an "innocuous" turn, becoming democratic and collectivist.

Very important in the case of the proletarian is his poverty, when considered not so much absolutely as dynamically. He consumes the whole of his earnings, so that he can never save more than a trifling sum,

and he has practically no prospect of rising out of his class. Nor is he threatened merely by poverty in his old age; his existence is distressingly uncertain, seeing that he goes ever in peril from accidents and from strikes and lock-outs—misfortunes for which social legislation can provide little help, and even labour organisation no adequate remedy. Moreover the proletarian when at work uses tools and machinery owned by another, his labour power is controlled by others' will, and he works for the benefit of a stranger. Payment by results is supposed to fulfil the collectivist and individualist demand of harmonising the earnings with the real value of the labour; but in reality it furnishes the merest caricature of civic occupation, and the only privilege secured by the proletarian on piecework is as a rule the privilege of over-working himself. Finally we have to note the divorce of the proletarian from the soil, and the massing of the industrial workers that results from the concentration of industry. This matter will first be considered.

Agriculture in all its varieties, the association of life and work with what is termed "nature," provides, as psychoanalysis has shown, extremely important sublimations of

the incest wish. Otto Rank and Sachs² attribute to the inauguration of agriculture a role in the breaking-down of taboos. In actual fact, agriculture is the basis of civilisation, chronologically, economically, and psychically. In the ideology of all nations, union with the earth denotes union with the mother as primal source of energy, the creation of force out of that which is the very foundation of life. At the same time the earth (which can so exhaustively symbolise the mother in virtue of its protective and nutritive characteristics, its all-embracing qualities, and numerous other analogies) serves as the foundation of so effectively autonomous a system of work and enjoyment that it can persistently function for the sublimation of the incest wish. Moreover, from this union with the soil springs fidelity to various traditions, an unaggressive national sentiment, stability. The French revolution gave an interesting demonstration that no progress can be achieved without such a foundation, for this revolution did not originate among the tillers of the soil, but among the town-dwellers, burghers and intellectuals, in whom there arose a powerful ideology aiming at the return to mother earth

² Die Bedeutung der Psychoanalyse für die Geisteswissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 1913, p. 73.

and at the creation of force from the earth.¹ The proletariat is the first social class which has been radically, we might say pathologically, divorced from the soil. Whilst the urban bourgeoisie is saved from complete detachment from the soil because of its financial resources, power of mobility, and various other associations, the proletariat, owing to its poverty, and owing to long hours of labour and to atomisation (a proletarian characteristic which is nowise in conflict with concentration), has been exiled from the land. Proletarians lose all contact with the soil; they lose all affective traditions, not excepting undogmatic traditions; and they lose national sentiment, not because they have many opportunities for contact with the foreign world, but for internal reasons. Thus the proletariat can think of mankind only as a homogeneous, landless mass, like itself. The impulse towards emigration, though it often has a rationalistic basis, may in part arise from an exogamic trend.²

Every loss of tradition, especially if it be not associated with a material and general

¹ Cf. the detailed account of this matter in Lorenz's previously quoted work.

² Cf. *Wurzellosigkeit, Ahasuerismus*, A. von Winterstein, *Zur Psychoanalyse des Reisens, Imago*, 1912.

rise in level, with new and more refined sublimations, brings danger in its train, for it engenders a tendency towards grave regression to older and coarser traditions. The proletariat, cut loose from the soil, yearns for a return to earth as an end in itself. Without traditions, the proletariat nevertheless clings tenaciously to its Marxist dogmas. The workers, by strenuous toil, can secure no more than means for a penurious existence; but they dream of the paradise which mother earth will provide. "Bountiful nature provides for all," writes Wilhelm Weitling. As we have seen, the anarchist communist status is the world of the mother regression. Lorenz insists that the communist movement is under the sign of man-to-man eroticism (Proletarians of all lands unite!); but, he says, the ideal to be attained is the pure mother principle. The contrast with the ideology of the French revolution is classical. In the last-named movement, even in its preparatory stages, interest was concentrated upon the land (the physiocratic doctrine); subsequently the Antaeus motif received its due meed of attention, this being in part the foundation of panegyrics of war. Here the earth is a basis, but not a goal; the road leads through the earth, but not to the earth (introversion and re-

generation, the deriving of force from the unconscious for the conscious). The ideology of "virtue" is anagogic, sublimatory, progressive. Very different is it with communism. The preparatory theories, and, above all, the proletariat, have no dealings with the earth from which they have been estranged; they apply to agriculture superficial analogies borrowed from industrial life, and they lack both knowledge of and feeling for the real nature of the agricultural problem. In especial the proletarian has no understanding for the moral value of non-exploiting private property in land, petty proprietorship—although in ultimate analysis this moral value is unquestionably not affectively conditioned. He regards a mechanical counterpart of industrial concentration as essential. Since his own class is agglomerated and is devoid of private property, he depicts the return to the land as a mass movement, which would not be a collection of forces for further evolution, but an ascent into heaven for which evolution would be superfluous. Karl Kautsky¹ describes the aim as communism in material production and anarchism in spiritual production. This phrase excellently sums up proletarian anarchist communism. The con-

¹ The Social Revolution.

dition cannot be a perfect one, for in that case it would forfeit the proletarian class character. The goal of the proletarian brethren is not the womb, but a far more social mother community. And despite all hostility for the actual father, there may still, in such a community, remain a place for the father. The intention to bring about the involution or at least the reduction of the division of labour,¹ is likewise connected with the general return to earth. Gustave le Bon's saying, that socialism is the religion of persons who in the contemporary world have been deprived of their foothold, may be restated by saying that proletarian ideology, arising in the souls of those who are divorced from the soil, aspires towards complete regression to earth. The substratum of communist Russia is constituted, on the one hand by a still extant primeval agrarian communism, and on the other hand by the "class-conscious" proletariat of an extensively small but intensively highly developed industry—a proletariat which has adopted the role of the old-time Varangian invaders.

¹ Cf. Kropotkin, *op. cit.*, Chap. XV., etc.

VI

INFANTILE EL DORADO FANTASY OF
COMMUNISM

It is no mere empty simile to say that the proletariat wishes to unite itself into a huge family community. The communist principle, work according to power, consumption according to need, is in its essence an infantile principle. Stress is not laid on the development of the powers, for communists hope to get along with very little work! Stress is laid upon voluntary, direct, spontaneous sympathy with the community; upon obedience inspired by the personal impulse of the doer; upon the qualities of the "good" child. Enjoyment according to need relates no less clearly to the childish existence. The child does not fend for itself; its consumption is not regulated in accordance with the work it does. The characteristic of its position is that it is more often at odds with its parents on account of unsuitable wishes than on account of immoderate wishes; very often trouble arises because of its unwillingness to accept something, especially some particular food. The principle of the peaceful regulation

of needs, or that of the enforced regulation of needs, is maintained in full validity. On the one hand, communism proposes to abolish all work which produces a disagreeable feeling of fatigue (this is communism in the anarchistic form); on the other hand, it proposes in case of need to constrain people to the performance of certain disagreeable tasks. What is lacking to the whole system is an *indirectly* applicable coercion of life; a constraint which, as is needful, will demand from human beings vigorous work; but which—notably through the free choice of occupation and the honouring of toil—shall create a specific and somewhat severe hedonism of labour. This form of labour is a strongly sublimated adult form, whereas the form of labour under communism is a dualism of childish play and childish learning. We may regard as an emanation of this, Kautsky's naive formula concerning communism in economic life and anarchism in spiritual life, which involves a reversal of the primitive relationship of play in the physical field and compulsory work in the intellectual field. This compromise formation between the wish on the one hand and the demands of reality on the other (the work of adults, especially of proletarian adults, is predominantly physical) is natural enough in

the sedate Kautsky, a man of thoroughly scientific temperament. The more extreme anarchist communist conception involves the adoption of a coercion to associated labour—a coercion which is in due time to be replaced by voluntary impulse—the whole process being purely regressive.

The progressive modification of communism, authoritarian collectivism, tends to an increasing extent to adopt the father principle, projecting into society the father who is just in the allotment of rewards; this implies a transition from infantilism to the condition of riper youth, with at the same time a closer relationship to reality. We are already on the way to the real justice which makes use of the father merely as a principle of systematisation; we are on the way to adulthood.

I must now approach a problem of extraordinary importance. It seems to me that the more extensive the regression towards the ideal of the embryonic condition, the less will this unceasing backward pursuit of the primitive horde constellation be crowned with success, and the more essential will it become to take into consideration the elements of reality. In fact the climax of the condition conflicting with the reality principle is the foetal condition, where the environment is

utterly different from our reality. The more the individual develops, the more manifold the ways in which he enters the sphere of our reality, and the more decisively therefore does the ontogenetic or the social motif supersede the phylogenetic motif. For an understanding of proletarian communism we need a far greater number of realist outlooks than we need for an understanding of absolute anarchism. As we approach the goal of manhood, the relationships of the primitive horde pass from our ken. It may be open to question whether this interesting association of the forms of organisation with their contents exists along the whole line. I consider that to this extent at least there is such an association, that we are justified in attempting to refute a communist theory which assumes a psychoanalytical complexion. I am thinking of Paul Federn's theory.¹ Federn holds that communism, the abolition of private property, represents an action of the brethren against the father, and signifies the overthrow of paternal dominion. This idea is unsound in so far as the revolt against the father, and the communalisation of his privileges, do not represent a progressive motif, but a re-

¹ Zur Psychologie der Revolution, Die Vaterlose Gesellschaft, Vienna and Leipzig, 1919.

gressive and titanic motif, whereas progress is synonymous with the disappearance of the whole situation characteristic of the primitive horde. From the outlook of progress, it is necessary that in the revolutionary struggle against the contemporary father, who is often regressive, use should be made of antipaternal regressive forces; but as soon as the aim of regression has been attained, we find ourselves not on the remoter but on the hither side of the father. The intellectual cause of the error lies in the assumption that the condition of the primitive horde, and, speaking generally, our knowledge of the impulsive life as ascertained by psychoanalysis, provide a key for the understanding of life in its entirety, whereas it remains the preeminent task of psychoanalysis applied to higher spheres, to ascertain precisely what limits are imposed upon the influence of this factor. Whilst the decisive victory of the primitive factor affords an exhaustive explanation of anarchism, it is far from giving an exhaustive explanation of proletarian ideology. Even though we see that in extant society the father principle operates to some extent as a force hostile to progress, nevertheless no syllogism exists to convince us that progress is to be secured by the destruction of the

father principle, by the gratification of the fatherhood wish of the brethren of the horde, perhaps in the form of a new paternal dominion (dictatorship) even stricter than the old. What we need is the further sublimation of the father principle, a further remove from the primitive horde. What we need, consequently, is not communism, but the generalisation of property (liberal socialism). If we must use the "dialect of original sin" we may say that this would be a society consisting only of fathers. But such an idea would be somewhat of a caricature, and considering the matter simply from the libido outlook it could not be fully adapted to the primitive horde conception. A society based upon the generalisation of property would realise Federn's hope that the parricidal brand can be effaced from the brow of man. On the other hand, it would not signify the renewal and the final success (as Federn imagines) of the attempt of the clan brethren—no such success could ever be achieved. The generalisation of property would imply a further evolution of extant society upon the foundation of preexistent development, and not upon the foundation of the renouncement of pre-existent development. It would be a society which would not only be fatherless, without

paternal rule, but would also be motherless—not of course in the sense of lifelessness, but in the sense of the higher life, sublimation and not regression.

Communism, nevertheless, does not propose the abandonment of such goods as progress has achieved. What communists, apart from a few enthusiasts for poverty, desire, is not the sacrifice of the acquirements of technical progress. For the establishment of the future society they look to a technical progress which is almost inconceivable to-day.

Now herein lies the absurdity of communism. Herein we have a further self-revelation of communist infantilism. To the anarchist absurdity, which we stigmatised as the absurdity of a society of fetuses, there succeeds a mitigated absurdity, less uncongenial, less blatant, but in reality no less absurd. The communists aspire to found a society with undeveloped organisation in conjunction with marvellously developed technique. No one needs a profound knowledge of sociology to perceive the impossibility of carrying out such a plan. But the psychoanalyst will push his criticism a stage further, and will discover traces of a manifestation with which the study of the psychology of individuals has long made him familiar. I refer to the

belief in the omnipotence of thought.¹ Speaking generally, a magical belief in the powers of thought is characteristic of the primitive stage² and above all of childhood. In the embryo there is no discrepancy between wish and reality (anarchism); in the subsequent course of development, the omnipotence of hallucination, gesture, and thought, becomes dominant. In totemism and compulsion neurosis, the part played by the omnipotence of thought is very striking. In communism, the manifestation of this fancy takes a somewhat different form—a matter to which we shall refer presently. From the “omnipotence” of thought springs scientific research, the passage from imaginary to real activity. Should this transition fail to occur, we are confronted with a new species of the omnipotence of thought, side by side with the autoerotic manifestation of totemism; this we may term the narcissistic variety. I mean that the above-described construction of reality makes a further (imaginary) concession, adopt-

¹ Cf. Totem und Tabu, III; Ferenczi, Die Entwicklungsstufen des Wirklichkeitssinnes, Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, 1913; J. MacCurdy, Die Allmacht der Gedanken und die Mutterleibphantasie, Imago, 1912.

² Cf. the present writer's essay, Activity and Passivity in the Growth of Civilisation [Hungarian], Huszadik Szazad, Budapest, 1918.

ing a form which corresponds better to the actual taking of reality into consideration; it relates to the already developed ego, devotes the ego to the service of libido regression, and is therefore narcissistic. The idea of the omnipotence of thought manifests itself in the imaginary systems, and psychiatrists are familiar with it as paranoia. But the matter cannot be fully considered here. The important point for our purposes is that communism looks for a development of a mass of requisites, for the high development of industrial technique, without any structural and real development of society. In actual fact, however, the advance of technique can only occur concomitantly with an advance in the division of labour, concomitantly with the advance of social differentiation. But that some fine day social differentiation may become superfluous, and that even its regression may be possible, is merely the idea of the dull pupil who has far too concrete a conception of the materials of knowledge, and who cherishes some such fancy as that knowledge can be poured into the brain through a funnel. Just as the foetus is unable to use its hand, and just as a little child is incompetent to drive a motor car, so the fruits of technical progress will not be at

the disposal of a community which is not a master of technique, which cannot develop technique, and which cannot even make an intelligent use of extant technical acquirements. The war might at least have taught this lesson.¹

Consequently the rationalism of the proletariat, the blind faith in the power of industrial technique, is an antisociological, imaginative, and infantile rationalism, although not identical with the *tabula rasa* rationalism of the anarchists. We shall shortly consider its proletarian foundations and its theoretical superstructure. Our immediate concern has merely been to elucidate the infantile El Dorado fantasy of the communists.²

VII

ORIGINS OF PROLETARIAN IDEOLOGY

It may have struck the reader that I have failed to follow to its logical end the deduction of proletarian ideology from the proletarian mode of life, and that after describing the

¹ Cf. B. Boyneburg, *Die Despotie der Mittel*, Vienna and Leipzig, 1919.

² The El Dorado fantasy is admirably described by P. Ernst, *Der Zusammenbruch des Marxismus*, Munich, 1919, p. 113.

land complex I returned to the direct characterisation of communist regression. My reason was that a systematic description of the causes and forms of the communist movement would have lain beyond the scope of the present work, which is concerned only with such matters as come within the purview of the psychoanalyst. It therefore seemed more appropriate to examine characteristics and origins by turns. A glance at origins may now usefully precede a further study of characteristics.

The land complex was not introduced fortuitously. Capitalism, the institutional form whence the proletariat and proletarian communism are derived, is itself closely connected with the land problem. It is far from my intention to formulate hypotheses concerning the origin of capitalism, or to attempt an answer to the question why the application of liberal principles has led to the establishment of a social order which is neither liberal nor individualistic. Light is thrown upon the economic and sociological side of the problem by the works of liberal socialist writers, but, for my purposes, the state of affairs must be accepted as given. Nevertheless I cannot refrain from a few remarks which concern our subject. What may be

termed the leading trends of liberal socialism, those of Henry George and Franz Oppenheimer, agree in representing that the unhappy developments of capitalism through which it has been brought into sharp contrast with individualism and free exchange, originated through the monopolisation of the land by individuals, or through the allowing of this system of monopoly to become established. The principles of equal rights and of private property were necessarily destroyed, for their very essence was injuriously affected by the economic identification of land with other things—seeing that land is not the outcome of human labour, is absolutely indispensable, and is not susceptible of increase, so that consequently its annexation by individuals is not private ownership properly speaking, but merely robbery sanctioned by custom. It is true that Oppenheimer considers that the main trouble does not lie in land ownership per se, but in large-scale landed proprietorship, which is the persistence of feudalism and the incorporation of the principle of domination, and cannot fail to poison the social order. It is probable, however, that a synthesis could be effected of George's and Oppenheimer's theories and the kindred programs of action. Lorenz (*op. cit.*) reaches

an outlook analogous to that of these two economists. He considers that the cause of regression to the condition of the primitive horde is to be found in the false identification of land with commodities.

It is evident, however, that at the foundation of the matter there lies hid, not a generalised logical fallacy perpetrated by the liberal theorists, but some deeply rooted social constellation. As far as concerns large-scale landed proprietorship, there is a manifest connexion between the libidinous tie man-earth and the authoritative tie father-child. When the end of serfdom came, and when liberalism won the victory, large-scale landed proprietorship ought to have come to an end, earth-eroticism ought to have assumed the form of petty proprietorship, while the likewise sublimated father principle should have induced the form of cooperative organisation. This did not happen, or at any rate not to a preponderant extent. Landed dominion persisted, although the libido tie of the "underlings" was to some extent loosened. Organisation upon the land did not keep pace with town development; eluding a further sublimation of libido, it underwent fixation at a lower stage. Hence the disharmony in social evolution. Peculiarly

characteristic of capitalism is the way in which this disharmony manifests itself by the lagging behind of agricultural production while industrial production advances. For reasons which cannot be adequately discussed, there has been a solution of continuity between the comparatively advanced portion of the social soul, and that portion which remains closer to fundamentals; there has been a collision between real life and the "archaic" libido fixation.¹ The treatment of land as a commodity may, just like the spirit of mammonism, the regressive element of capitalism as contrasted with the nobler individualistic element, be explained as an extensive resurgence of (repressed) analeroticism. Such a degradation, such a symbolic transformation, of the earth, in conjunction with the febrile increase in the mobility of the bourgeoisie, and on the other hand the fixation of the old earth hedonism, constitute the libido constellation which threatens to destroy the industrial sublimation.

In accordance therewith, during the course of capitalist concentration, there occurred an

¹ Freud institutes a comparison between entail and the germ plasm, the unprogressive specific factor. *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse*, III, p. 482; *Kleine Schriften zur Neurosenlehre*, IV, p. 84.

increase of that father motif which recalls large-scale landed proprietorship (trusts, the formation of propertyless proletarian masses, a "policy of social reform" as a secondary mitigation). In sharp contrast, however, to what took place under large-scale landed proprietorship, there simultaneously occurred a divorce from the soil, a lack of earth hedonism, insecurity, and landlessness. Hence arises the desire of the proletariat for a great regression and a return to earth, as a destructive aim.

We are now confronted with the problem which presents itself in similar form in the psychology of the individual as well. Wishes always proceed from extant reality. Which portion of reality do they approve, and which portion do they try to subvert? It would, for example, be expedient to study dreams in order to ascertain what elements of the dream are a reproduction of the situation which functions as its basis, and what elements represent the true wish fantasy. We may certainly assume that a wish gratification of this kind, deviating from a realist modification of the facts, will completely transform a part of the reality (by the path of the easiest application of the libido); whereas it will cling tenaciously to another portion of the

reality. This is what happens in connexion with proletarian ideology, which is not a critical project for reform, but an impulsive reaction against capitalist oppression.

The most definitely progressive elements of capitalism, namely, formal freedom of exchange, and private property, do not come into direct contact with the proletarian, and are not enjoyed by him. Consequently proletarians are inclined to seek the cause of their miseries in freedom of exchange and private property. The proletarian detests the authoritative elements of capitalism in their extant forms, but owing to his complete subordination and subjection he is incompetent to overcome them in the world of reality. Transforming them as it were in the sense of the Oedipus complex, he retains the power principle, endorses class egoism, and likewise acquiesces in mammonism in the form of historical materialism and in the form of indifference to agriculture. Finally, he wholly approves that class formation which subjects capitalism to the working class, since, for the orphaned proletarian individual, this class contains all the values of libido and struggle. The class becomes the symbol of the clan of the brethren, inspired with the aim of becoming father, of abolishing class and all

distinctions of class, of fusing in the great regression. For the abolition of class does not in this connexion signify the abolition of unearned income, but the abolition of differences in income and of the occupational differentiation necessarily associated therewith. The characteristics that distinguish communism from anarchism are likewise manifest. Whereas the regression of anarchism is immediate and direct, communism derives to a far greater extent from reality, reckoning with reality, and receiving from reality its formal manifestations. Its ambivalence is less conspicuous, the stress being transferred by communism, from unbridled force and unrestricted regression, to the fatherhood wish of the horde of brethren. Indeed, the interweaving with motifs akin to reality, especially in certain phases and varieties of the movement, is so remarkable, that a keen eye is requisite for the detection of the kernel which conflicts with the reality principle.

Marxist ideology and the rationalism peculiar to that ideology cannot be fully analysed without a glance at the role of the machine. The machine is doubtless able to fulfil a very different psychical function from that fulfilled by the earth and by the living environment. Whereas these latter can become the objects

of a general psychological community (earth hedonism, the feeling for nature), machines are introjective transferences, and at a higher stage they are projective transferences, of the bodily (working) organs.¹ They arouse a technico-rationalistic spirit. In virtue of their symbolism it seems probable that they can also act as psychological derivatives, but there are several obstacles to this. K. Bücher² maintains that the machine gradually loses the old rhythm; new rhythms doubtless arise, but are not apperceived because of the specialisation of the workers, because they have become means to an end. Worth noting is J. Zitzlaff's³ observation that in the higher stages of machine development the comprehensive activity of the workman must increase, but this tendency is counteracted by the capitalist interest in keeping wages down—an interest hostile to production. It is also of decisive importance that the machine is neither the individual nor the collective property of the worker. The universal materialism associated with machine development is accompanied by a hatred for the machine

¹ Cf. Ferenczi, *Zur Psychogenese der Mechanik, Imago*, 1919, p. 394.

² *Arbeit und Rhythmus*, 3rd edition, Leipzig, 1902, p. 418.

³ *Arbeitsgliederung in Maschinenbauunternehmungen*, Jena, 1913, pp. 30-8.

which often finds expression in sabotage, and this supplies one component of the ardent antirationalism which is at work within communism, and of the fantasy of the absolute regression to the earth. The disturbance of equilibrium characteristic of capitalism, the fatality which has placed the acquirements of evolution at the service of regression, is markedly accentuated in proletarian ideology.

VIII

MARXISM AS A SOCIAL PSYCHOSIS

Historical materialism, one of the main pillars of Marxist doctrine, is in part filched from capitalist mammonism, but has been reclad in a philosophical vesture which was prepared for Marx by Hegel, a thinker with a feudal trend. Marx espoused the Hegelian dialectic with great energy, merely replacing spirit in that system by economics, conceived as autonomous, independent, mystically operative. Ultimately capitalism was to be repudiated, but only through its own activities. At the highest stage of capitalist development would ensue the expropriation of the small number of large-scale capitalists who would

then remain in existence, and the transition to communism would take place. Simultaneously, historical materialism would cease to be applicable; man would pass from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. Everything which might interfere with this development is to be regarded as unessential detail, as vestigial, as the manifestation of petty-bourgeois narrowness, and so on. The whole task of mankind is to be found in measures for accelerating transformation, in the overcoming of temporarily determined hindrances, in tactics.

This mystical materialism discerns in everything the ego impulse alone, the impulse to self-preservation, and, dependent thereon, the impulse to establish and maintain the power of class. To this extent it is rationalistic. It is likewise rationalistic in that it compresses all its doctrines into a rigid system of strict and inalterable determinism, predestined to a definite historical close, when it will be replaced by an entirely different world, the anarchist communist kingdom of heaven. The applied form is likewise ultra-scientific, equipped with dry, technical designations and mathematical formulas. Nevertheless, the idolatrous character of the system, and the brusque stigmatisation as "unscientific" of

all questions as to the "future state" (that is to say, as to the real aim of Marxism), suffice to arouse the suspicion that the whole has an affective rather than a rational basis. The idea of the salvation of the world by the proletarian class vividly recalls the motif of the role as saviour and the great good fortune of the youngest brother or some other person who has been despised and rejected;¹ it signifies the wish fantasy of the son, who is inferior in power to the father, and longs to gain possession of the mother (earth, land, the world). For the rest, we have all the signs of a paranoid construction. The following characteristics confirm this conclusion. There is an exclusive stressing of the ego, which is however projected upon an impersonal Moloch, economics. The psychical significance of the machine, and the early disturbance of the proletarian's ego, are additional indications; a similar disturbance of the ego usually plays its part in the mechanism of paranoia, but in this case its uniform character as a class manifestation elucidates the mass summation of the psychosis. I have already referred to the megalomania, which is another characteristic of paranoia. Hand in hand with this goes delusion of persecution. The

¹ This matter is fully discussed by Lorenz, *op. cit.*

exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie is grotesquely caricatured, so that all the institutions of the state, religious and moral systems, and even dominant scientific trends, are lumped together as methods of exploitation. I think there is good reason for the assertion, that Marxists are not free from the delusion of persecution; they regard every attempt at social reform made by those who are not Marxist devotees as designed by the exploiters to mislead and befool the proletariat. The salvation fantasy is common in religious paranoia.¹ The wrapping-up of the essential irrationality in an excessively rigid rationalistic system² corresponds to the aimless rationalism of the Marxists. The shrewd dialectic of paranoiacs is familiar; no less familiar is the manner in which they shut themselves away, erecting an impenetrable barrier between themselves and the rest of the world. Common to Marxism and paranoia are a dogmatic adhesion to doctrine and an equally uncritical scornful scepticism towards all extraneous ideas. The Marxist theory of value, which measures all value by labour

¹ Cf. Freud, *Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall von Paranoia*, *Kleine Schriften zur Neurosenlehre*, II, p. 206.

² Cf. Freud, *Ueber soziale Wirkungen*, p. 248.

time, is an elementary example of the rationalism of those who preach art for art's sake, of those in whose eyes "precision" outweighs knowledge.

Two characteristics show clearly that it would be wrong to look upon Marxism simply as a "case" of paranoia. The terminal aim as an exit from the system, the act of redemption which forces its way through the repression, the deliberate combination of the terminal regression with the intermediate constructions, bear witness to the unique character of the social psychosis. Moreover, we cannot detect in the social psychosis that homosexual fixation plays an important part such as it is supposed to play in paranoia. It is, however, necessary to point out that homosexuality associated with paranoia is not primary, but is a psychical, narcissistic construction. Therein, likewise, the important point is the entangling of the ego in the disorders of the libido development.¹ In this connexion there forces itself on our attention a comparison with a movement which exhibits numerous resemblances

¹ In the writings of Fourier, one of the most distinguished premarxian communists, we find strange expressions which recall the words coined by paraphrenics (for example: *cabaliste, composite, papillonne*). Fourier was aware that a great many absurdities were intermingled with his ideas; cf. the apparent dementia in paraphrenia.

to the Marxist movement; I refer to Christianity. The manifestations of the Oedipus complex, redemption, and the kingdom of heaven, which appear in Christian ideology in an archaic and metaphysical vesture, are poured by the Marxists into a scientific and materialistic mould. At first sight we may be allured by the notion that Christianity displays the characteristics of a compulsion neurosis, just as Freud declares that religion in general is "a universal compulsion neurosis." But there are many reasons for withholding assent to such a view. We seek vainly for the typical symptoms of the before-mentioned disease, for investigation compulsion, obvious indecision, a disharmony between ritual and conviction. As soon as Christianity had got beyond the primitive, anarchistic, antiritualistic attitude, equal attention was paid to ritual and to creed, and sometimes the preference was given to creed.¹ The important

¹ Judaism, on the other hand, with its hypertrophied ritual, its Talmudism, and its disdain for inner faith, displays a close kinship with compulsion neurosis. This may explain why Judaism could not conquer the world. It may not have been a chance matter that in the beginnings of the Christian and of the Marxist movement Jews played a leading part. Emancipation from compulsion neurosis ("salvation from ritual") may be either sublimatory or profoundly regressive. Cf. Reik, *Das Kolnide*, op. cit.; also an unpublished work by S. Feldmann dealing with the psycho-

part which hallucinatory ideas play in Christianity, makes that religion akin to paraphrenia and hysteria; nevertheless, we encounter in Christianity manic and depressive elements (ecstasy, seclusion from the world) which are foreign to communism. Taking all these points into consideration, it seems to me that they do not signify that communism is less regressive, but merely that the communist regression begins at a higher stage of evolution. The proletarians of the capitalist era are differentiated from the poor and the slaves of the classical world by far greater concentration, more systematic work, and more complete divorce from the soil; the regression of the proletariat is rooted in a highly developed society and in the ego itself; the projection is not cosmologico-physical, but socio-economic.¹ Class, the machine, "education in the factory" (Marx), confer upon proletarian ideology the stamp of paranoia; they give rise to the narcissistic idea of the omnipotence of thought, in contradistinction to totemism, analysis of Judaism. Concerning religion as a manifestation of compulsion neurosis, and philosophy as a manifestation of paranoia, consult Rank, *Der Künstler*, 3rd edition, Vienna, 1918, p. 60.

¹ Christianity was far less concerned with a direct onslaught upon slavery. Cf. F. X. Kiefl, *Die Theorien des modernen Sozialismus über den Ursprung des Christentums*, Munich, 1915.

wherein there is noticed no contradiction between the rudimentary ego and the (auto-erotic) belief in omnipotence; and in contradistinction to the sufferer from compulsion neurosis, whose evolved ego negates the (auto-erotic) belief in omnipotence ("obsession"!). Here the ego itself becomes a means towards the (narcissistic) belief in omnipotence. Contributory causes, doubtless, are the specific insecurity of the existence of the proletarian as a free workman, homelessness,¹ and the premature labours of the proletarian child, whereby it is led to outgrow both the childish world of fable and the intellectual and aesthetic atmosphere of our civilisation.²

The comparison of Marxist communism with Christianity and with the bourgeois revolution (the French revolution, with its peculiar differences both from communism and from Christianity) would be far more searching. Such a comparison, in conjunction with a systematic study of the neuropsychoses, could not fail to give valuable results, alike in the domain of the immanent problems, and in that of the relationships of individual and social

¹ Concerning the psychical significance of the home, and in especial concerning its mother significance, cf. Charlotte Perkins Gilman, *The Home, its Work and Influence*, New York, 1910, p. 22.

² Cf. R. Tschudi, *Das proletarische Kind*, Zurich, 1918.

psychoses. I have previously referred to the contrasted schema of the French revolution. I may add here that in association with the capitalistic materialism which has been adopted and accentuated by the proletariat, certain elements of proletarian ideology were already manifest in the French revolution. Lorenz quotes from Taine a case in which a country landlord was murdered because he was receiving from the state an annual income of thirty-six thousand francs, which would now be retained by the community. Here we already have in the germ the projection of historical materialism. But whilst the money element in this matter may justify inferences concerning anal-eroticism, materialism acquires in Marxism another complexion which is more general and which is completely antimaterialistic, antirationalistic, and regressive, in its trend. A sentiment of justice together with rationalism are contributory when Marx demonstrates with the aid of the theory of surplus value that the worker does not receive an adequate equivalent for his toil. Yet the communistic aim, whose realisation will make the value of the work done utterly irrelevant, is adduced as a logical inference from Marxist principles. This shows us once again how justice, rationality, and analogous develop-

mental values, can be turned to account in a reversionary canalisation of regression.

IX

BOLSHEVISM

Marxism loses much of its precision in the form of social democracy, where the trade unions in especial stand for moderation, for compliance with realist demands, and for collaboration with bourgeois democracy. The trade unions, indeed, in contrast with the class which takes its stand upon the doctrine of increasing misery and unalloyed Marxist "evolution," represent the real working-class organisations engaged in the fight for economic advantages. Obviously the social democrats of the trade unions lack coherent aim and far-reaching impetus. In them the titanic energy idealised by Marxist theory is damped down and dispersed rather than sublimated (in so far as the trade unions fail to bring any cooperatives into being). The same remark applies to Bernstein's revisionist trend, which is almost completely devoid of regressive character. A peculiar compost, which I can touch upon only in passing, is presented by

syndicalism. The adherents of this doctrine utterly reject the father principle, so that it culminates in a purely economic anarchism ; the increasing disregard of the communist aim, and the assigning of enhanced significance to the trade unions might perhaps be regarded as indications of an ameliorative process. A grave turn in the direction of psychosis is, however, manifest in bolshevism or Leninism. Owing to the war, this doctrine has risen to enormous power. I propose, therefore, to consider it in detail.

The war, that great syndrome of the malady of our civilisation, brought about for a time an extensive feudalist regression even among those nations which had more or less completely entered the bourgeois phase. Consequently the labour movement likewise experienced a change in the same direction. On the one hand the dissolution of reality stimulated the desire for the anarchist paradise ; on the other hand the reign of force and the widespread introduction of coercive regulations aroused in the brethren of the proletarian clan the desire to secure the rights of fatherhood. Socialism, which had been formed in the image of capitalism, remodelled itself on the feudalist example. A large proportion of the working class now espoused the dictator-

ship of the proletariat sustained by bayonets and the inquisition; hoped "to skip the capitalist phase"; aspired to inaugurate a centralised, despotic, and mechanical kneading of society. There appeared, as H. Mann has aptly expressed it, "a mixture of blood halitus and logarithms." Bolshevism was so direct an issue from the war, that psychoanalysis has few observations to make in this field. Nevertheless, I must refer once more to the *Psychology of Revolution* by Paul Federn, who discerns in the development of the soviet system the birth of the fatherless society of the brethren, and perceives therein the evolutionary potentialities of society. I have endeavoured to prove that these potentialities would not be realised through the victory of the brethren, but through the renewed sublimation of the father principle and a general remove from the condition of the primitive horde. In one of its forms the soviet system may really be an anagogic manifestation. But it cannot possibly be this as the restoration of patriarchal authority, which belongs to a lower stage of social evolution than bourgeois authority. It can only mark an advance as the cooperative democracy of free human beings, individual fathers as it were. This presupposes individual ownership. It is equally

incompatible with the fusion and with the subjugation of individuals. It is possible that the extant occupational councils, if the situation improves, may become the germs of such an evolution. This, however, would contrast, not only with bolshevism, but also with the peaceful communism which secures Federn's approval. Indeed, communism à la Federn is distinguished from bolshevism only by the lack of the outward insignia of the infringement of individual autonomy.

We may interpret bolshevism as a peculiar feudalist middle course between the direct regression of anarchism and the paranoid regression of Marxist socialism. It is most plainly characterised by its rejection of the written law and by the straightforward application of force. For the comparatively progressive, regulative, and organisatory form of the father principle, it substitutes the earlier, despotic form. Bolshevism excludes from the community the capitalists who have hitherto functioned as "fathers," and also excludes the members of the mercantile class who have not typically functioned either as "fathers" or as "sons," in order to have free scope for its own neopaternal caesarism. The abandonment of all moral and other scruples, the disregard, the rejection on prin-

ciple, of all distinctions whether individual or national, and the secondary, enforced, omnivorous extension of the class idea, throw a striking light upon the great regression, which is competent to acquire so effective a control even over the elements of reality. In like manner the rejection of the family indicates the libido concentration upon the foundation of a "united social family." I must emphasise my opinion that this does not imply an integrative or evolutionary development, any more than the mental constructions of the insane patient involve integration and evolution, even when they presuppose a kind of sexual repression. The exceptionally vigorous blazing up of militarism in the train of bolshevism, as well as other signs (the adoption of the feudalist policy of Jesuitism, corruption, secret agents, etc.), enable us to recognise that the bolshevisation of the world would signify its atomisation.¹

The uniformity of the movement is doubtless one of the causes of its poverty in symbolism.

¹ The Leninist view, in accordance with which a stateless paradise is to ensue upon the phase of intensified terror, singularly recalls the mystical schema of introversion and regeneration (Silberer). We know, however, that we really have to do with an unmitigated reversion. Of course, in the ultimate issue there might ensue, instead of the result really aimed at, the birth of a new civilisation. (In decades or centuries?)

The general and compulsory use of the terms "comrade" or "brother" in the Soviet Republic is accordant with the whole spirit. Remarkably enough, under the Hungarian Soviet Dictatorship, the term used for "comrade" was "elvtars." This signifies "one who holds the same views or principles," and the use of the term illustrates the dogmatist trend. Other practices remind us of the homogeneous horde of the brethren: for instance that everyone must be accounted a proletarian before he is worthy to be accounted a human being; the official designation of an author's earnings as "wages"; and so on. The effacement of differentiation is manifest in ideology as well as in administrative structure. For example: "The soviet is not a talking group but a working group." Sadism and masochism find the most manifold forms of expression (the "camp-followers"). As far as the colour red is concerned, this has had great official significance in the social democratic movement, but in the bolshevist movement it has risen to supreme dominion. Psychologically, red can function as the symbol of three different concepts, love, sin, and the revolution.¹ It thus logically corresponds to

¹ At the sitting of the Budapest Psychoanalytical Society, in May, 1920, Ferenczi summarised the matter by saying

uniformity, to the all-devouring action of the libido. Silberer¹ alludes to red as the colour of the philosopher's stone, of universal energy, and also as the colour of absolute love which knows nothing of conflict. The contrasted pair red and white which symbolises the opposed forces of bolshevism and the counter-revolution, is likewise of old date. Silberer points out that it expresses the contrasted pair man and woman, corresponding to the contrasted pair blood and bone; and it would seem that we might substitute the mechanically interpreted schema of activity and passivity. Unquestionably it is not to the revolution in general, but only to the bolshevik revolution that the colour red owes this important role.² The official art of the Hungarian Soviet Republic was the work of an ultrafuturist group of young poets and painters,

that the flush of joy suggested love, the blush of shame suggested sin, and the flush of anger suggested revolution. In this matter he followed Freud.

¹ Op. cit.

² From the psychological point of view it would be instructive to compare the aesthetics of Hungarian bolshevism (March to July, 1919) with that of the earlier bourgeois social democratic revolution (October, 1918). In the October revolution the tone was set by various distinctions, by nationalist and other specialities. On the day of the revolution the chrysanthemum served as symbol, and the name of the flower became the nickname of the revolution.

the study of whose mentality would contribute valuable results to a psychology of bolshevist intellectuals. There would loom largely in such a study the figure of the anarchist who has been given a chance for the realisation of his aims. Speaking generally, bolshevism is characterised by the withdrawal of inhibitions and repressions, by a motor discharge, subject of course to the essential demands of Marxist orthodoxy. To some extent, however, bolshevism may be looked upon as a regressive dissolution of paranoiac rigidity, to enable the adherents of the movement to draw nearer to their goal. Anent the part played by Russianism in this development, I may refer to a valuable essay by H. Hess on *The Brothers Karamazoff or the Destruction of Europe*.¹ Hess traces the associations of the Russian psyche in its certainty that the overthrow of Europe is imminent. These associations are: regression into the Asiatic home, into the primal mother; hostility to every ethical norm; the unity of good and evil (the Demiurge=God-Devil, the regressive abolition of the condition of the primitive horde?); chaos. He characterises the typical Russian in the following terms:

¹ Die Brüder Karamasoff oder der Untergang Europas, Neue Rundschau, 1920.

“The Russian is dangerous, emotional, and irresponsible; at the same time he has a tender conscience, is sensitive, dreamy, cruel, profoundly childlike.” We may regard the bolshevik as representing a transitional personality between the proletarian of central and western Europe and the type described by Hess.

X

CONCLUSION

I am fully aware that this disquisition is sketchy and elementary. A systematic survey and discussion, from the psychoanalytical standpoint, of the manifold varieties of anarchist communism, a consideration of their sociological and psychological relationships, would require a much more comprehensive work. My aim has been to stimulate thought on the subject, and I have introduced sociological and critical considerations in passing merely, when these were indispensable. No far-reaching study of the psychology of the subject has been attempted; nothing has been said concerning the psychical reactions of strikes; tactical problems, etc., have hardly

been considered at all. Unless compelled to do so, the author has not transcended the limits of the conflict with the reality principle which is of interest to psychoanalysts. In so far as the study I have initiated may, in a more expanded form, be found to possess sociological and political value, this value will consist in the demonstration that in ultimate analysis anarchist communism has a reactionary character. In matters of detail, psychoanalysis can only be regarded as an instrument of adequate investigation. It seems still more questionable for the time being whether these studies can advance the study of the psychology and psychiatry of the individual. In any case, a knowledge of the considerations I have adduced may help to sharpen the vision of the practising psychoanalyst, and may even make it easier for him to discover hitherto unnoticed pathological mechanisms.

A few associated themes still require mention. One of these is the psychoanalysis of the individuals who participate in and lead such movements. Analytical methods are likely to yield a rich harvest in this field. A few points may be mentioned. Quite a number of anarchists are dogmatic vegetarians and teetotallers, being influenced perhaps by

the idea of a return to nature;¹ the same remark applies to the excessive simplification of clothing, to the wearing of sandals, to the growing of beards. Young people of the anarchist communist persuasion, especially those who are Russian in origin or tastes, like to dress simply and yet conspicuously; they wear grey jerseys; the young men have very long hair, the young women very short hair. These manifestations lead us to infer the existence, in part of narcissism, and in part of bisexuality. Such narcissism may be an individual parallel of the narcissism which affects the proletarian class (absorption of the ego in regression, ultramodernism). Bisexuality may help to explain women's eager participation in advanced social movements. This andromorphism, this assumption of masculine characteristics, is so conspicuous, and psychoanalytical investigations disclose it so indubitably, that in women with ardent political convictions (in so far as their attitude is not mere conservatism or caprice) we have every reason to expect the discovery of masculine traits. Our first need, however, is for

¹ During the bolshevist episode in Hungary I heard an elderly anarchist say: "Henceforward we must cure our illnesses by natural methods; we have got rid of the lawyers, and we must get rid of the doctors as well."

facts, and in this respect the psychoanalytical study of individuals has more important tasks!

The first fruits to be expected from the continuation of study along the lines suggested in the present work will be the solution of socio-psychological and methodological problems. What is the nature of the parallelism between the individual and society, and within what limits does that parallelism exist? In what social movements is it most conspicuous? What is the value of analogies between individual psychoses and social psychoses? Can we from these analogies draw conclusions which would be useful for therapeutic purposes? Such questions can be answered as follows. The mechanical parallelism is more conspicuous, the more predominant the regressive element; progress involves increasing differentiation. Analogies certainly exist between individual psychoses and social psychoses, but social projection in the case of the community corresponds to the ego projection of the individual; moreover, in society there are more extensive opportunities for contact with reality, but on the other hand there are wider possibilities for regression. The structural differences, in so far as they are not further reducible, may be grouped

around this nucleus. As far as therapy is concerned, in the social psychoses the canalisation of the libido towards useful ends seems a valuable principle, but it is one which is not simply coincident with the adequate solution of the social problem. When we contemplate the matter from this outlook, we see that the liberal socialist movement bears to purely formal democracy and liberalism the same sort of relationship that psychoanalysis, with its demand for greater activity on the part of the physician, bears to the older, cathartic method of cure. That trend of liberal socialism which favours a mechanical break-up of landed property into small areas, and at the establishment of a system of petty proprietorship, wrests from ideal economic expediency a temporary concession in favour of transient psychical expediency—effecting so to speak a canalisation of libido. Just as the lower stage of repression avails itself of idealisation, so too in social life does the negative principle of the critical condemnation of antisocial wishes require to be supplemented by the positive principle of sublimation. But to follow up these considerations would lead us beyond the scope of the present work. I shall have achieved my aim if the psychoanalytical study initiated and continued

therein should attract the attention of master minds, and if the tasks I have outlined should be earnestly undertaken by competent investigators.

GLOSSARY

[With special acknowledgments to Dr. Ernest Jones, many of the definitions being taken from his *Papers on Psychoanalysis*.]

Affect. Feeling ; the essential constituent of emotion.

Algolagnia. Sexual excitement aroused by pain. When the excitement is caused by the infliction or by the witnessing of pain, we speak of **Sadism**. When the excitement is caused by the suffering of pain, we speak of **Masochism**.

Ambivalence. The coexistence of opposed feelings, e.g. love and hate.

Anagogic. Upward-tending, i.e. tending to promote an upward movement. Used figuratively in the moral sense.

Anal-erotism. Sexual excitement aroused by stimulation of the anus.

Autoerotism. Sexual excitement occurring independently of actual relations with another individual, and self-induced either physically or mentally.

Canalisation. A term employed of the libido, which see. The diversion of the libido into a new channel. See **Sublimation**.

Cathartic. Adjectival form of **Catharsis**, which see.

Catharsis. The purging of the effects of a pent-up emotion by bringing it to the surface of consciousness.

Censor and Censorship. A figurative impersonation to denote the sum of repressive forces. Also spoken of as "the endopsychic censor." (See **Repression.**)

Complex. A group of emotionally tinged ideas partially or entirely repressed.

Compromise Formation. A compromise between memory and the repressive forces, whereby the partially repressed memory is permitted to enter consciousness, but in a disguised form.

Compulsion Neurosis. A neurosis in which, by unconscious psychic determinism, the patient is compelled to think or act in a way which is usually repugnant to his conscious mind.

Constellation. A group of emotionally invested ideas not repressed.

Dementia praecox. A common form of insanity in which the patient loses contact with reality and withdraws into a world of his own imaginings.

Electra Complex. Excessive attachment, sexually tinged, of the daughter for the father. The feminine counterpart of the **Oedipus complex**, which see.

Endopsychic Censor. See **Censor.**

Fixation. The arrest of an affect at a more primitive stage than that normally corresponding to the individual's age and development. Especially used of the fixation of a daughter's sexual affection upon the father (father-fixation, see **Electra Complex**); and of the fixation of a son's sexual affection upon the mother (mother-fixation see **Oedipus Complex**).

Foreconscious. A region of the mind containing memory traces which can only be aroused by exceptionally strong stimuli or by special effort.

Fundamental Complexes. Those complexes that are universal constituents of the normal mind, notably the ego complex, the herd complex, and the sex complex. The term is also applied to the "nuclear complexes," which see.

Homosexuality. Love for a member of the same sex.

Idealisation. A form of projection (which see), wherein the mind projects an ideal of personality upon some real person—hero or beloved.

Incest. Sexual act with a near relative, or the desire for this; often unconscious. See **Oedipus Complex** and **Electra Complex**.

Inspectionism. The desire to look at, especially the desire to look at the sexual organs or sexual acts, or at organs and acts mentally associated with sex. The counterpart of "exhibitionism."

Introversion. The turning of mental interest inward, away from the realities of the outer world.

Libidinous. Adjectival form of **libido**, which see. Must not be understood in the narrow sense of purely physical sexual desire.

Libido. Sexual hunger; the mental aspect of the sexual instinct. But by psychoanalysts the term "sexual" is used with very wide connotations, so that "libido" becomes almost synonymous with "psychic energy." Indeed, Tansley defines **libido** as "the psychic energy inherent in the great natural complexes, or becoming attached to any individual complex, and discharging itself along the appropriate conative channels."

Masochism. See **Algolagnia**.

Narcissism. The concentration of interest (usually sexual interest) upon one's own body and one's own personality in general.

Nuclear Complexes. Freud gives this name to the Oedipus complex and the Electra complex.

Oedipus Complex. The (usually unconscious) desire of a son to kill his father and possess his mother.

Paranoia. A form of insanity characterised by systematic delusions.

Paraphrenia. Freud's name for dementia praecox, which see.

Projection. The ascribing to the outer world mental processes that are not recognised to be of personal origin; a characteristic symptom in paranoia.

Psychoanalysis. A study and analysis of man's unconscious motives and desires as shown in various nervous disturbances and in certain manifestations of everyday life in normal individuals.

Reality Principle. The principle in virtue of which (for the needs of self-preservation and species-preservation) the growing organism has to become adapted to the exigencies of reality, has to subordinate to distant aims the imperious demand for instant gratification.

Regression. The reversion of mental life, in some respects, to that characteristic of an earlier stage of development, often an infantile one.

Repression. The keeping from consciousness of mental processes that would be painful to it.

Reversion. See **Regression**.

Sadism. See **Algolagnia**.

Sublimation. The employment of energy belonging to a primitive instinct in a new and derived, i.e. non-primitive channel. E.g. the use of sexual energy in "intellectual" love or creative artistic work.

Symbolism and Symbolisation. The means whereby the workings of the unconscious are veiled from the conscious mind.

Syndrome. A group of associated symptoms, appearing simultaneously or successively, so as to form a definite clinical picture of disease.

Titan, the. A figurative impersonation of the unconscious. (See **Unconscious.**)

Titanic. Adjectival form of **Titan**, which see.

Traumata. Injuries, mental or bodily. "Sexual traumata" are experiences in the sphere of the sexual life, bodily or mental, which have produced a mental shock.

Unconscious. A region of the mind normally inaccessible to consciousness. Often figuratively impersonated.

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
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